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V. THE IMPACT OF ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY ON
PRIVILEGE AND THE APPLICABILITY OF THE ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT.*

Electronic discovery raises a range of issues in the area of
privilege law that have challenged courts and litigants alike. When a
propounding party seeks to obtain large volumes of electronic data in
discovery, one of the biggest concerns for the producing party is the
protection of privileged communications. This Part addresses a
number of problems that a litigant must resolve in developing a
discovery plan that safeguards the integrity of privilege claims. Part
V.A. sets out the legal framework applicable to privilege claims and
examines how it has been applied in the context of electronic
discovery. Section V.B. discusses the types of privilege claims that
litigants have raised in electronic discovery, focusing particularly on
the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine. Part
V.C. identifies the threat that the unique characteristics of electronic
data pose to privilege protection and summarizes the traditional and
innovative approaches proposed by litigants and courts to avoid
waivers of privilege. Part V.D. analyzes the impact that electronic
discovery may have on the five factors applied by a majority of
courts to determine the effect of an inadvertent disclosure of
privileged communications.
Finally, this Part addresses the applicability of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) to electronic discovery. Part
V.E. discusses the different interpretations of the ECPA and the
extent to which the privacy of litigants is protected under each. It
also hypothesizes how the ECPA may influence litigants in their use
of emerging electronic discovery tools.
Sasha K. Danna: J.D. Candidate, May 2006, Loyola Law School; B.A.,
Art History and Italian Language and Literature, Smith College, June 1998. I
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A. Legal Frameworkfor Privilege in ElectronicDiscovery
1. Applicable Federal Rules: Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26 and Federal Rule of Evidence 501

Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) were
created before the advent of electronic data systems, they nonetheless
provide an adequate framework within which to resolve many of the
issues that arise in the context of electronic discovery.' Generally,
the FRCP contemplate broad discovery; however, the discovery that
a civil litigant is permitted to seek is subject to some limitations. 2 In
fact, FRCP 26(b)(1) restricts a party's right to obtain discovery to
"any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the ... claim or
defense of the party." 3 This language provides for the categorical
exemption from discovery of matters that do not meet the applicable
1. See Williams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 665 F.2d 918, 933 (9th Cir. 1982)
("[D]iscovery requests relating to the computer.., should be processed under
methods consistent with the approach taken to discovery of other types of
information."); Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 56 Fed. R. Serv.
3d (West) 1159, 1161 (W.D. Tenn. 2003) (setting out the scope of discovery as
governed by FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), the limitations of discovery as governed
by FRCP 26(b)(2)(i)-(iii) and asserting that "[e]lectronic information, if
relevant, generally is discoverable under these same guidelines."); Jones v.
Goord, No. 95 CIV. 8026, 2002 WL 1007614, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2002)
("The [FRCP] albeit for the most part drafted in an earlier era, deal perfectly
well with the problems occasioned by discovery of electronic 'documents'.");
Indiana Coal Council v. Hodel, 118 F.R.D. 264, 266 n.3 (D.D.C. 1988) ("That
a computer system is at issue here does not require application of different
discovery principles."); see also Cornel Research Found., Inc. v. Hewlett
Packard Co., 223 F.R.D. 55, 73 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) ("Rule 34 permits discovery
of electronically or digitally stored information."); Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v.
Hasbro, Inc., No. 94CIV.2120, 1995 WL 649934, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3,
1995) (noting the application of Rule 34 to computerized data); Daewoo Elecs.
Co. v. United States, 650 F.Supp. 1003, 1006 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986)
("[I]nformation which is stored, used, or transmitted in new forms should be
available through discovery .... "); FED. R. Civ. P. 34 advisory committee's
note.
2. Jones, 2002 WL 1007614, at *1. The court in Jones commenced its
opinion by stating that "[b]road discovery is a cornerstone of the litigation
process contemplated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Id. However,
the court acknowledges that discovery is limited by the principles of relevance
and privilege. Id. at *6; see also Medtronic, 56 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) at 1161
(considering a request for production of electronic data and noting that
"discovery does have 'ultimate and necessary boundaries').
3. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added).
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4 to be
standards of relevance, as well as those matters deemed
S
privileged, even if they do satisfy the relevance requirement.
Because the FRCP do not expressly enumerate the privileges
entitled to protection under federal law, FRCP 26(b)(1) depends for
its meaning on Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 501, which provides
that "the privilege of a witness, person, government, State or political
subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United
5 This rule has been
States in the light of reason and experience."
construed to warrant the preservation of privileges existing at
common law, while at the same time providing the courts with some
6
Nonetheless,
degree of discretion to recognize new privileges.
courts will only recognize a new privilege where it would advance
fundamental public policy objectives which override the presumption
in favor of discoverability. 7 Once a party asserts a privilege that is

4. In addition to the categorical limitations on discovery created by Rule
26(b)(1), the Federal Rules also endow federal courts with broad discretion to
limit discovery under the following circumstances:
(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or
is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less
burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has
had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the
information sought; or (iii) the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit taking into account the needs of
the case, the amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the
importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance
of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2).
For a discussion of how courts resolve requests to limit electronic discovery on
the grounds of undue burden, see supra Part IV.C.5.
5. FED. R. EvID. 501; see Von Bulow v. Von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 141
(2d Cir. 1987) (indicating that "[t]he principles by which a federal court
determines whether material sought [under Rule 26(b)(1)] is privileged are set
forth in Fed. R. Evid. 501").
6. See Jaffe v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1996) (explaining that FRE 501
"did not freeze the law governing the privileges of witnesses in federal trials at
a particular point in our history, but rather directed federal courts to 'continue
the evolutionary development of testimonial privileges"') (citing Trammel v.
United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980)); Koch Materials Co. v. Shore Slurry
Seal, Inc., 208 F.R.D. 109, 116 (D.N.J. 2002) ("The privileges noted in Rule
26(b)(1) are encompassed in Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.").
7. See Jaffe, 518 U.S. at 9 (cautioning that "[e]xceptions from the general
rule disfavoring testimonial privileges may be justified... by a 'public good
transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means
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contested by an opposing party, federal courts apply these two rules
to determine whether the matter sought to be discovered falls within
a federally recognized privilege, and, if so, to hold that such matter is
8
immunized from discovery.
A party claiming a privilege as to a paper or electronic
document has the initial burden of establishing that the matter sought
to be protected does in fact qualify as privileged. 9 Under the FRCP,
a party is empowered to protect his or her evidentiary privilege and is
allowed to "withhold[] information otherwise discoverable under
[the] rules" by claiming that it is privileged or subject to protection
as trial preparation material.' 0 In doing so however, "the party shall
make the claim expressly and shall describe the nature of the
documents, communications, or things not produced or disclosed in a
manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or
protected, will enable other parties to assess the applicability of the
privilege or protection."' '
2. Legal Framework Applied
While many courts have long operated under the assumption
that the FRCP apply to the discovery of electronic media, fewer have
for ascertaining truth') (citing Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50); SENATE COMM. ON
S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 7059 (1974) ("[I]n approving this
general rule as to privileges, the action of Congress should not be understood
as disapproving any recognition of... [privileges previously recognized by the
Supreme Court]. Rather.... [it reflects] the view that the recognition of a
privilege based on a confidential relationship and other privileges should be
determined on a case-by-case basis.").
8. See Cornell Research Found., Inc. v. Hewlett Packard Co., 223 F.R.D.
55, 59 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) ("Rule 34 permits discovery of electronically or
digitally stored information provided, of course, that it meets the relevance test
articulated in the rules governing pretrial discovery and there is no other proper
basis [such as privilege] for denying or restricting the discovery sought.").
9. See Streamline Capital, L.L.C. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., No. 02
Civ.8123 PKC MHD, 2005 WL 66898, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2005)
(assessing whether e-mail messages were privileged, the court noted that "the
party invoking the privilege bears the burden of proving each element of the
factual basis for that privilege claim and must do so by competent evidence");
Long v. Anderson Univ., 204 F.R.D. 129, 134 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (clarifying in a
dispute over the discoverability of an e-mail that defendants, "[a]s the parties
seeking to establish the privilege,.. . bear the burden of demonstrating that all
of the requirements for invoking the attorney-client privilege have been met").
10. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5).
11. Id.
THE JUDICIARY,
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specifically announced this principle. 12 In addition to expressly
declaring that the FRCP govern electronic discovery, Jones v.
Goord13 represents one of the first cases to systematically apply14
data.
FRCP 26 and FRE 501 to a privilege dispute over electronic
In Jones, the court addressed a discovery dispute involving electronic
media in a class action suit filed by prison inmates against the New
York Department of Correctional Services, contesting the conditions of confinement. 15 After producing over 700,000 pages of
documents, the defendant opposed the plaintiffs motion to compel
production of the defendant's electronic database.' 6 The defendant
claimed that the database contained prison personnel and inmate files
that were subject to a qualified, if not full privilege, based on prison
The defendant further argued that the
security concerns. 17
confidentiality of the electronic files could not be adequately
safeguarded by any existing or conceivable protective order.18
In deciding whether to grant the protective order, the court first
cited FRCP 26(b)(1) for the proposition that irrelevant or privileged

12. The United States Supreme Court applied the FRCP to a discovery
request for electronic data as early as 1978. See Oppenheimer Fund Inc. v.

Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 362 (1978); see also Playboy Entm't., Inc. v. Wells, 60
F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1053 (S.D. Cal. 1999) ("Defendant has cited no cases
finding that electronically stored data is exempt from discovery."); AntiMonopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., No. 94CIV.2120, 1995 WL 649934, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 1995) ("[T]oday it is black letter law that computerized data
is discoverable if relevant."); Ind. Coal Council v. Hodel, 118 F.R.D. 264, 266
(D.D.C. 1988) (indicating that requests to discover electronic information
should be treated the same as other discovery requests); Daewoo Elecs. Co. v.
United States, 650 F. Supp. 1003, 1004 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986) (commenting
that the discovery dispute before the court "is a good example of how the
development of new technology for using, storing and transmitting information
allows parties to test the rules of... discovery"); see also Medtronic Sofamor
Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 56 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 1159, 1161 (W.D. Tenn.
2003) (considering as a threshold matter that the parties did not dispute that the
electronic data requested by defendant satisfied the relevance requirements
imposed by Rule 26(b)(1)); Cornel Research Found., 223 F.R.D. at 73
(describing the applicability of FRCP 34 to electronically stored information).
13. No. 95 CIV. 8026, 2002 WL 1007614, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2002).
14. See id. at * 5-*10.
15. Id. at *1.

16. Id. at *3-*4.
17. Id. at *4.
18. Id. at *5.
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matters are not discoverable. 19 The court then relied on FRCP
26(c)(1) to establish that the trial judge has broad discretion to tailor
discovery narrowly to protect a party from undue burden or
expense. 20 These two rules formed the framework that the court
asserted "applies to requests for electronic or computer-based
21
information just as it applies to more traditional materials."
The court then applied the framework to the defendant's
objections. After assuming that a substantial part of the information
contained in the database was relevant, the court addressed the
defendant's privilege claim. 22 In accordance with FRE 501, the court
consulted federal common law to evaluate the merits of the
defendant's claim that prison personnel and inmate files are
privileged and protected against discovery for security purposes. 23 In
the absence of precedent supporting the existence of a privilege for
prison personnel and inmate files, the court rejected the defendant's
privilege claim. 24 Although the court declined to decide whether it
should recognize a privilege for prison personnel and inmate files, it
noted that privileges "are not lightly created ...

for they are in

truth.",25

Nonetheless, the court did
derogation of the search for
acknowledge the possibility that some of the information on the
26
database may have fallen within the "more traditional" privileges.
The court ultimately avoided making "broad legal proclamations
about privilege" by denying the motion to compel pursuant to Rule
significantly
26(b)(2) because the burden of the electronic discovery
27
case.
the
resolving
for
benefits
likely
the
outweighed
Jones essentially proposes that, where possible, courts should
seek to evade a litigant's request to recognize a new privilege on
grounds of undue burden rather than engaging in a privilege
analysis. 28 Considering that production of documents can be
19. Id. at *6.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at *8-*9.
23. Id. at *8.
24. Id. at *8-*9.
25. Id. at *8 (citation omitted).
26. Id. at *9.
27. Id.
28. Id. The court instructed that rather than inquiring whether a new
privilege should be created, courts should seek to dispose of the question of
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extremely time consuming and expensive particularly in the context
of electronic discovery, 29 discovery requests seeking electronic data
are more likely to be unduly burdensome than those seeking paper
documents. Where electronic rather than traditional discovery is
concerned, courts may have more success in deflecting issues of
privilege creation by focusing principally on whether motions to
compel can be denied as unduly burdensome. Only in instances
where the benefits of electronic discovery outweigh the burden
should a court consider whether the motives for creating a particular
privilege justify shielding the electronic data from disclosure.
3. Questions Unanswered by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Jones demonstrates that the FRCP and the FRE, particularly
FRCP 26 and FRE 501, provide an adequate framework for the
judicial resolution of privilege claims arising in electronic discovery
after the privileged document has been identified. In electronic and

traditional discovery alike, after segregating privileged documents
from non-privileged ones, parties usually assert privileges by timely
30
FRCP 26(b)(5).
submitting a privilege log in accordance with
Failure to satisfy the requirements of this rule can result in grave
consequences for the privilege holder. 3 1 However, where privilege
discoverability by balancing the benefit and burden of the discovery request.
Id.
29. See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
30. See supra note 10 and accompanying text; see also Banks v. Office of
Senate Sergeant-at-Arms, 222 F.R.D. 7, 21 (D.D.C. 2004) ("[P]rivilege logs
have become the universal means of claiming a privilege when a party claims
that certain documents are privileged from discovery.... ."); Medtronic
Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 56 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 1159, 1172,
1175 (W.D. Tenn. 2003) (instructing the plaintiff to review his electronic
databases for privileged information and provide the defendant with a privilege
log).
31. See Felham Enters. (Cayman) Ltd. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's,
No. 02-3588 c/w 04-624, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20983, at *9-*10 (E.D. La.
Oct. 19, 2004). In Felham, the plaintiff propounded discovery of "all
electronic files, paperless files, computer files, [and] computer work station
files" pertaining to the claim. Id. at *3. The defendant's privilege log was
untimely, overbroad, and did not adequately describe the contents of the
privileged documents, thus denying the plaintiff an opportunity to contest the
claim. Id. at *9-*10. Based primarily on these circumstances, the court held
that the defendant had waived any claim of privilege to the electronic data
requested. Id. at *10; see also SEC v. Beacon Hill Asset Mgmt., 02 Civ. 8855
(LAK) (HBP), 2004 U.S. Dist LEXIS 15031, at *42-*43 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3,
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logs fail to convey the merit of a claim of privilege and the privilege
is contested, courts will usually make a determination based on an in
camera review of disputed documents rather than deeming that the
privilege has been waived.32 In most cases, compliance with FRCP
25(b)(5) poses no particular challenges once privileged materials
have been identified.33
It is usually before privilege claims are asserted and disputed,
34
however, that electronic discovery complicates matters for litigants.
For parties whose privileged documents are seeded among masses of
stored electronic data, the main concern and challenge is identifying
2004). Here, the defendant asserted that an electronically stored contact list
was privileged three weeks after the deadline for producing privilege logs. Id.
at *42. Defendant claimed the delay was due to the fact that the "list did not
exist" until it was printed out. Id. The court rejected this claim as frivolous,
stating that "[t]he fact that data has not been printed out does not mean that the
document does not exist." Id. at *43. Failure to include the contact list in the
privilege index constituted a waiver of any privilege claim. Id.
32. Some courts frequently resort to in camera reviews, finding that
privilege logs are generally insufficient to prove the existence of a privilege.
See, e.g., Banks, 222 F.R.D. at 21 (ordering the production of documents for in
camera review after stating, "I have reviewed the privilege log and find, as I
invariably do, it is useless"). But see Navigant Consulting, Inc. v. Wilkinson,
220 F.R.D. 467,473-74 (N.D. Tex. 2004) ("[A] privilege log and an in camera
review of documents may assist the court in conducting its [privilege]
analysis.... [However], 'resort to an in camera review is appropriate only
after the burdened party has submitted detailed affidavits and other evidence to
the extent possible."' (citation omitted)).
33. But see United States v. Stewart, 287 F. Supp. 2d 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
In Stewart, Defendant listed an e-mail originally sent to her attorney on the
privilege log, but failed to identify the forwarded version of the message sent
to her daughter on the log. Id. at 436. Despite Defendant's disclosure of the email to opposing counsel, the court ultimately held the e-mail was protected
under the work product doctrine. Id. at 469. Nonetheless, Defendant had to
withstand judicial review before surviving the claim of privilege.
34. See Jones v. Goord, No. 95 CIV. 8026, 2002 WL 1007614, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2002) ("[T]he first step in [any discovery analysis] is
deciding whether requested material.., is relevant and not privileged.").
However, deciding how to make this determination may be very difficult in
practice particularly where electronic discovery is concerned. See Medtronic,
56 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) at 1160 (noting that the parties had not been able to
agree on a protocol for production, the court recognized that as an initial
matter, "[p]roducing electronic data requires.., several steps: (1) designing
and applying a search program to identify potentially relevant electronic files;
(2) reviewing the resulting files for relevance; (3) reviewing the resulting files
for privilege; (4) deciding whether the files should be produced in electronic or
printed form, and (5) actual production").
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and protecting the privileged material from disclosure. 35 Difficulties
arise particularly in electronic discovery with regard to discerning
which documents out of many qualify as privileged, and therefore
can and must be withheld to prevent waiver. 36 Perhaps the greatest
question left unresolved by the FRCP in the context of both
traditional and electronic discovery concerns the inadvertent
production of privileged materials. 37 Whether such a circumstance
constitutes a waiver of privilege, and what parties can do to avoid
such waiver are important matters on which the Federal Rules remain
35. See Medtronic, 56 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) at 1168. The court
emphasized that the physical production of the electronic data was not the
issue. Id. The real challenge was presented by "[t]he production of... data in
a format [Plaintiff] can use, and in a way that accommodates [Defendant's]
privilege concerns.. .

."

Id.; see also Ken Withers, Two Tiers and a Safe

Harbor: Federal Rulemakers Grapple with E-Discovery, FED. LAW., Sept.
2004, at 35, available at http://www.kenwithers.com/articles/index.html (last
updated Oct. 19, 2004). During the period of public commentary following the
issuance of the proposed amendments by the Advisory Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure dated May 17, 2004, nearly all commentators
expressed recognition of the burden of conducting privilege review in response
to electronic discovery requests. Id. at 23.
36. See Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Sandoz Ltd., 916 F. Supp 404, 410 (D.N.J.
1996). In Ciba-Geigy Corp., Defendants inadvertently produced a privileged
document from an electronic database after failing to identify it. Id. Finding
that the disclosure constituted a waiver, the court warned that "the inadvertent
production of a privileged document is a specter that haunts every document
intensive case." Id.; see also Cheney v. United States Dist. Ct., 124 S. Ct.
2576, 2597 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The Court validated the
government's objection to an overly broad discovery order on the basis that it
imposed an unconstitutional burden which violated the separation of powers
doctrine. Id. at 2588. The government lamented the burden imposed by the
federal district court's discovery order, explaining that each box of potentially
responsive documents:
requires one or two attorney days to review and prepare a rough
privilege log. Following that review, privilege logs must be finalized.
Further, once.., responsive e-mails are identified, printed, and
numbered... privilege review and logging process [will] be equally,
if not more time-consuming, due to the expected quantity of individual
e-mails.
Id. at 2598.
37. See Kenneth J. Withers, Forward to MICHELE C.S. LANGE & KRISTIN
M. NIMSGER, ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE AND DISCOVERY: WHAT EVERY
LAWYER SHOULD KNOW, at iv (ABA ed., 2004) ("Since 2000, the case law has
exploded, and the cases deal with a number of complicated questions,
including.., the effect of inadvertent production of privileged electronic
communications.").
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silent. 38 The resolution of such questions on a case-by-case 39 basis
has challenged courts and litigants to devise discovery plans that
prevent inadvertent disclosure in the first place.40 The following two
sections will identify the privileges most frequently at issue in
38. Neither is this question resolved by the proposed amendments to the
FRCP issued by the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE U.

S.,

REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMM.,

app. at 6-7 (2004) (proposed amendments to Rule 26(b)(5)(B)) [hereinafter
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS AND COMM. NOTES], available at http://www.
uscourts.gov/rules/comment2005/CVAugO4.pdf.

Under

the

proposed

amendments to FRCP 26(b)(5)(B):
[w]hen a party produces information without intending to waive a
claim of privilege it may, within a reasonably time, notify any party
that received the information of its claim of privilege. After being
notified, a party must promptly return, sequester, or destroy the
specified information and any copies. The producing party must
comply with Rule 26(b)(5)(A) with regard to the information and
preserve it pending a ruling by the court.
Id. at7.
Notably, the language of the rule still preserves the court's discretion to
find that inadvertent production of a document results in a waiver of any
privilege that previously attached. Many commentators have suggested that
this ambiguity could be settled at once by amending the FRCP to contain a
clear abrogation of the common law rule applied in some jurisdictions that
inadvertent disclosure of privileged information may constitute a waiver. See
Withers, supra note 35, at 11. However, such a modification of the FRCP
would probably exceed the delegation of the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072, which provides for the prescription of procedural and evidentiary rules
as long as they do not alter any substantive right. Id. Furthermore, under 28
U.S.C. § 2074(b), the United States Supreme Court is barred from adopting a
rule that alters a privilege without Congressional approval. See Gregory P.
Joseph, Proposed Electronic Discovery Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 1 (2005) at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/e-delivery/04-CV066.pdf.
39. See Ciba-Geigy Corp., 916 F. Supp. at 410-411 ("One line of cases
holds that the inadvertent disclosure of a privileged document vitiates the
privilege and constitutes a waiver.... At the other end of the spectrum lies a
line of cases which espouse the 'no waiver' rule.... The [majority] approach
takes the middle of the road, and focuses upon the reasonableness of the steps
taken to preserve the confidentiality of privileged documents." (citations
omitted)).
40. See Medtronic Safomor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 56 Fed. R. Serv. 3d
(West) 1159, 1168 (W.D. Tenn. 2003) (noting that one of the court's main
concerns was devising an electronic discovery plan that enabled plaintiff to
respond to a request for large volumes of data, while at the same time
preventing disclosure of privileged documents).
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electronic discovery, discuss the adequacy of traditional methods of
privilege protection, and analyze parties' and courts' innovative
approaches to privilege protection.

B. Privileges Most FrequentlyImplicated in ElectronicDiscovery
It is well established that electronic communications are no less
paper
or
verbal
than
status
of privileged
deserving
4 1 At the same time, the mere fact that information
communications.
is retained in an electronic form does not warrant its protection from
disclosure. 42 The important question is whether there are any
differences between privileged information contained in paper-based
documents and that stored in electronic form that would justify
greater judicial leniency towards the latter.
41. According to the American Bar Association (ABA), "a lawyer may
transmit information relating to the representation of a client by unencrypted email sent over the Internet without violating [the confidentiality provisions of]
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct," as long as the client consents to
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l
that mode of communication.
Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 (1999). In addition, the ABA has found
that e-mail messages "pose no greater risk of interception or disclosure than
other modes of communication commonly relied upon as having a reasonable
expectation of privacy," and "[t]he level of legal protection accorded
e-mail transmissions... supports the reasonableness of an expectation of
privacy. ... " Id.
Courts and state legislatures, such as California and New York, support
the proposition that electronic communications are worthy of privilege. See
City of Reno v. Reno Police Protective Assoc., 59 P.3d 1212, 1218 (Nev.
2002). The court indicates that the electronic format of the communication
does not preclude a finding of privilege. Instead, "[c]ourts have generally
looked to the content and recipients of [an] e-mail to determine if the e-mail is
protected ... . [A] document transmitted by e-mail is protected by the
attorney-client privilege as long as the requirements of the privilege are met."
Id.; see also CAL. EviD. CODE § 952 (West 1995) ("A communication between
a client and his or her lawyer is not deemed lacking in confidentiality solely
because the communication is transmitted by... electronic means between the
client and his or her lawyer."); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4548 (McKinney 1998) ("No
communication privileged under this article shall lose its privileged character
for the sole reason that it is communicated by electronic means or because
persons necessary for delivery or facilitation of such electronic communication
may have access to the content of the communication.").
42. See Holland v. GMAC Mortgage Corp., No. 03-2666-CM, 2004 WL
1534179 (D. Kan. June 30, 2004) (stating that the "mere fact that a document
is a computer record or an electronic document does not warrant protection
from disclosure" and rejecting a request for a protective order that would
designate as confidential all computer records).
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Federal courts recognize a number of privileges, including but
not limited to the attorney-client privilege, the psychotherapistpatient privilege, the spousal privileges, thepriest-penitent privilege,
and the privilege accorded to state secrets. 3 In addition, under the
work product doctrine, federal courts also protect the confidentiality
44
of materials prepared by the parties in anticipation of litigation.
The privileges asserted most commonly by parties during discovery
are the attorney-client privilege and the work product privilege.45
Consequently, privileges other than those protecting attorney-client
communications and work product 46are less likely to be implicated in
the context of electronic discovery.
For example, there is no case law to date dealing with the
spousal privileges, the psychotherapist-patient privilege, or the
priest-penitent privilege in the context of electronic discovery. The
reason for this may be that these types of privilege holders do not
rely on electronic communications to convey important information
to the extent that in-house counsel and corporate officers do. On the
other hand, it could be that privilege claims based on electronic
communications between these types of groups are simply not as
frequently contested. The remainder of this section will focus on the
electronic discovery cases involving the attorney-client privilege and
the work product doctrine.
1. The Attorney-Client Privilege
The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to "encourage full
and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and
thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law
and administration of justice." 47 Furthermore, effective "advocacy
43. See generally MURL A. LARKIN, FEDERAL TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES
(1982-2002) (setting out the privileges recognized by federal courts and

extensively referencing case law on the subject).
44. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
45. See 7

JAMES WM.

MOORE ET AL.,

§ 37A.30(5)(a) (3d ed. 1999).

MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE

46. Eric Van Buskirk, Practical Strategies for Digital Discovery:
PreliminaryConsiderations,THE DIGITAL DISCOVERER, Feb. 2003, at 3 ("The
most common privileges involved in digital discovery are likely those of
attorney-client and work product.").
47. Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 389; see also Women's InterArt Ctr. v. N.Y.C.
Econ. Dev., 223 F.R.D. 156, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (setting out the elements of
the attorney-client privilege and explaining its purpose in the context of
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serves public ends and... depends on the lawyer's being fully
informed by the client." 48 Courts resolving disputes involving the
attorney-client privilege apply the same tests to electronic
communications as would be applied to traditional paper
documents.49
a. E-mail

One way in which clients increasingly communicate with their
attorneys is through e-mail. 50 It is particularly in litigation involving
electronic discovery).
48. Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 389.
49. Long v. Anderson Univ., 204 F.R.D. 129, 134 (S.D. Ind. 2001)
(considering whether an e-mail communication was privileged under the
attorney-client privilege, the court turned to the general standard adopted by
the Seventh Circuit: "(1) where legal advise was sought; (2) from a
professional legal advisor in his capacity as such; (3) the communications
relating to that purpose; (4) made in confidence; (5) by the client; (6) are at his
instance permanently protected; (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal
advisor; (8) except the protection be waived") (citing 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2292 (McNaughton rev. 1961)). Other circuits have applied the same
standard in the context of electronic discovery. See, e.g., Uniroyal Chem. Co.,
Inc. v. Syngenta Crop Protection, 224 F.R.D. 53 (D. Conn. 2004); United
States v. B.D.O. Seidman, LLP, No. 02 C 4822, 2004 WL 1470034 (N.D. Ill.
June 29, 2004); Cornell Research Found. Inc. v. Hewlett Packard Co., 223
F.R.D. 55 (N.D.N.Y. 2003); United States v. Stewart, 287 F. Supp. 2d 461
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); Naquin v. UNOCAL Corp., 53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 1079
(E.D. La. 2002); Lewis v. UNUM Corp. Severance Plan, 203 F.R.D. 615 (D.
Kan. 2001); see also Visa U.S.A., Inc. v. First Data Corp., No. C-021786JSW(EMC), 2004 WL 1878209 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2004). In analyzing
whether corporate e-mail messages were privileged, the court in Visa U.S.A.,
Inc. applied a standard newly adopted by the Ninth Circuit. Id. at *4. Under
previous Ninth Circuit precedent, "the protection of the [attorney-client]
privilege applie[d] only if the primary or predominantpurpose of the attorneyclient consultations [was] to seek legal advice or assistance." Id. at *3 (internal
quotation omitted). The court found that the messages were not privileged
under the newer more protective test which takes into consideration "the
totality of the circumstances and affords protection when.. . '[a] document [is]
created because of anticipated litigation, and would not have been created in
substantially similar form but for [that] prospect."' Id. at *3-*4 (quoting In re
Grand Jury Subpoena, 357 F.3d 900, 908 (9th Cir. 2004)).
50. Discovery disputes involving e-mail messages between attorneys and
private individuals seemingly arise much less frequently than those involving
e-mail messages between attorneys and corporate clients. In fact, there is a
scarcity of case law dealing with assertions by individuals of the attorneyclient privilege with respect to e-mail messages sent to counsel. See Stewart,
287 F. Supp. at 463 (responding to her attorney's ongoing requests for factual
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corporations, however, that parties have occasion to resist discovery
of e-mail messages pursuant to the attorney-client privilege. 5 This
seems to be due to two relatively recent developments-corporate
dependence on electronic communications for efficient functioning
and the increased role of in-house and outside counsel in the
corporate decision-making process. 52 Courts have recognized that email messages addressed to in-house counsel by corporate officers,
employees and other corporate legal representatives frequently
contain information regarding both legal and business matters. 53 As
a result, courts exercise heightened caution when making privilege
determinations regarding e-mail messages sent by, addressed to, or

information pertinent to her securities fraud defense, defendant prepared an email memorializing the circumstances of her sale of stock); Turner v. Brave
River Solutions, No. Civ. 02-148 D, 2003 WL 21418540, at *1 (D.N.H. June
18, 2003) (acknowledging that the plaintiff, a private individual, asserted the
attorney-client privilege as to an e-mail sent to him by his attorney which was
inadvertently produced to defendant). But see Nicholas v. Wyndham Intern.,
Inc., 224 F.R.D. 370, 371 (D.V.I. 2004). Plaintiffs sued a resort and its
employee who they claimed had inappropriate sexual contact with their son.
Id. at 370. Plaintiffs exchanged e-mail communications with the Assistant
Attorney General of the Virgin Islands on the subject of defendant-employee's
criminal prosecution. Id. at 371. The court found that the e-mail messages
were not subject to the attorney-client privilege because they were not
communications between plaintiffs and their attorney. Id. at 372 n.4.
51. See, e.g., Collaboration Props., Inc. v. Polycom, Inc., No. C-024591MMCEMC, 2004 WL 296953 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2004); Grill v. Costco
Wholesale Corp., No. C03-2450RSM, 2004 WL 2314640 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 7,
2004); Visa U.S.A., Inc., 2004 WL 1878209; Gucci Am., Inc. v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., No. 03CIV.5220(LBS)(DFE), 2004 WL 1562838 (S.D.N.Y. July
12, 2004); Pfizer Inc., v. Ranbaxy Labs Ltd., No. CIV.A.03-209-JJF, 2004 WL
1376586 (D. Del. June 18, 2004); Teleplus, Inc. v. Avantel S.A., No. S.A. 98CA-849 WWJ, 2004 WL 23282491 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 9, 2003).
52. See United States v. Segal, No. 02-CR-1 12, 2004 WL 830428, at *3
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 2004) ("One challenge to our privilege analysis is that the
expanded role of the corporate general counsel has blurred the line between
business and legal advice... Additionally the rise of e-mail as the primary
mode of corporate communications permits the broad dissemination and nearcomplete documentation of corporate communications.").
53. See Bell Microproducts, Inc. v. Relational Funding Corp., No. 02 C
329, 2002 WL 31133195, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 2002) ("[A]s is often
signaled by such legal titles as [Vice President and General Counsel], a lawyer
employed as house counsel sometimes wears his or her lawyer's hat but also
sometimes wears a businessman's or businesswoman's hat-or on occasion he
or she may don both simultaneously.").
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forwarded to in-house counsel.54 In fact, courts have regarded with
particular skepticism claims that e-mail messages are subject to the
attorney-client privilege because they have either been copied or
forwarded to in-house counsel.55
An e-mail message is only privileged to the extent that it
contains legal advice or client confidences, regardless of whether the
communication was sent by or addressed to a privilege claimant's
Litigants that seek to pass off non-privileged
attorney. 56
54. See Segal, 2004 WL 830428, at *3 (noting the difficulty of making
privilege determinations in situations where e-mail messages are transmitted
between a corporate officer and general counsel); Teleplus, Inc., 2003 WL
23282491, at *3 ("E-mail documents [transmitted between in-house counsel
and corporate employees] are of particular complexity when determining
whether they should be privileged.").
55. See United States ex rel. Fields v. Sherman Health Sys., No. 01 C 2495,
2004 WL 905934, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 28, 2004). Defendant's employee sent
an e-mail to another employee and to defendant's attorney. Id. The e-mail
disclosed contents of a discussion with a non-lawyer. Id. The fact that the email was copied to defendant's attorney did not make the communication
privileged. Id.; see also In re Gabapentin Patent Litig., 214 F.R.D. 178, 186
(D.N.J. 2003) ("Forwarding an e-mail ... to an attorney does not transform it
into the attorney's work product... Neither can it be said that communications
between clients, unrelated to legal issues or advice, fall under the attorney
client privilege... Cc'ing numerous people who are ancillary to the
discussion, one of whom happens to be an attorney, or forwarding an e-mail
several times until it reaches an attorney does not amount to 'attorney client
communication."'); Mac-Ray Corp. v. Ricotta, No. 03-CV-523S(F), 2004 WL
1368857, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. June 16, 2004). One of plaintiffs senior executives
sent an e-mail to two employees in the human resources department with a
copy to plaintiff's in-house counsel. Id. The e-mail recited the facts of
defendant's resignation and as such did not seek legal advice or assistance. Id.
56. See Women's InterArt Ctr., Inc. v. N.Y.C. Econ. Dev., 223 F.R.D. 156
(S.D.N.Y. 2004). In its privilege inquiry, the court focused on the content of an
e-mail and an attached draft letter, as well as on the identity of the sender and
recipient. Id. at 161. The court reasoned that "[s]uch documents retain their
privilege if 'they were prepared for the purpose of obtaining legal advice
and/or contain information a client considered but decided not to include in the
final version ... ' or if it is demonstrated that a confidential communication
was removed from the final document." Id.; Visa U.S.A., Inc., 2004 WL
1878209. Visa asserted the attorney-client privilege as to several e-mail
messages that contained embedded messages that had either been authored or
received by Visa's in-house counsel. Id. at *10. The court rejected the claim,
noting that the messages were not prepared because of a legal purpose. Id.; see
also, Bell, 2002 WL 31133195, at *2 (claiming that non confidential e-mail
messages were privileged merely because an attorney was one of multiple
recipients); B.F.G. of Ill., Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., No. 99 C 4604, 2001 WL
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communications as privileged "by routing them through an
successful in prevailing on a privilege claim
attorney ' 57 are seldom
58
challenged:
once
[This] is not of course how privilege (or for that matter
work product) operates ... [T]he mere presence of a
lawyer's name at the top or bottom of a document is not the
bell that causes the dog named Privilege to salivate. What
is entitled to protection is really limited to the
communication of confidences from client to lawyer,
whether any such confidences (or sometimes the fact that
confidences have been communicated) [are] disclosed 59in a
client-authored document or lawyer-authored response.
There are two important reasons why such a "full boar" 60 and
undifferentiating approach is harmful to the adjudicative process and
will therefore not be tolerated. 6 1 First, "[a] particular problem with
this scenario is that there is no way that the party seeking the
documents can detect... improper use merely from the description
on the privilege log." 62 Second, parties who characterize as
privileged re-routed electronic communications pose a serious threat
to the efficient and just resolution of legal conflicts. 63 Thus,
[u]nless in-house counsel and litigation counsel are
1414468, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 2001) (routing communications of a nonlegal nature through an attorney and claiming privilege).
57. B.F.G. ofIll., Inc., 2001 WL 1414468, at *6.
58. See Women's InterArt Ctr., 223 F.R.D. at 161. The court determined
that a draft letter sent between non-lawyers and attached to e-mail
correspondence addressed to counsel did not qualify as privileged. Id.
However, the court did recognize that the e-mail itself was privileged. Id.; see
also Bell, 2002 WL 31133195, at *2 (ordering the defendant to produce e-mail
messages sent to or from its in-house counsel acting in a business capacity
rather than in a legal capacity); B.F.G. of Ill., Inc., 2001 WL 1414468, at *6
(identifying two e-mail messages sent to corporate counsel through an
intermediary as having been wrongfully withheld as privileged).
59. Bell, 2002 WL 31133195, at *1 (citing Nedlog Co. v. ARA Servs., Inc.,
131 F.R.D. 116, 117 (N.D. Ill. 1989)) (emphasis omitted).
60. Id.
61. See B.F.G. of ll., Inc., 2001 WL 1414468, at *6 ("[C]onsistent with

decisions of other federal courts, [the court in this case would] not tolerate the

use of in-house counsel to give a veneer of privilege to otherwise nonprivileged business communications.").
62. Id.
63. See id.
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scrupulous in their assertion of privilege, the courts will be
asked to review all documents in which an in-house
attorney's involvement is the basis for assertion of privilege
an unbearable burden
or work product. That would impose
64
litigants.
other
and
on the courts
Courts may impose a particular burden on corporations to
demonstrate that allegedly privileged e-mail messages are not merely
business related communications. 65 An unsupported claim that an email message is privileged may cause the court to scrutinize
corporations' internal electronic communications practices to
determine whether they function to deliberately mislead opposing
counsel and the court. 66 Corporations that employ deceptive e-mail
64. Id. at *7. Over 500 allegedly privileged documents were submitted to
the judge for in camera review. Id. at *5. See also Banks v. Office of Senate
Sergeant-At-Arms, 222 F.R.D. 7, 21 (D.D.C. 2004) (ordering that 400
documents claimed to be privileged be submitted to the court for an in camera
review).
65. See B.F.G. of Ill., Inc., 2001 WL 1414468, at *6. In the context of a
privilege dispute over e-mail messages, the court stated that in circumstances

where corporate counsel works with a business team, "there is a particular
burden on that corporation to demonstrate why communications deserves

protection and are not merely business documents." Id.; see also Visa U.S.A.,
Inc. v. First Data Corp., No. C-02-1786JSW(EMC), 2004 WL 1878209, at *10

(N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2004) ("The involvement of in-house counsel alone [in email communications] is not enough for the attorney-client privilege to be
applicable. Because in-house counsel is often extensively involved in the
business matters of the company... [c]ourts have not been willing to presume
that the services provided were of a legal, as opposed to a business, nature.").
66. See Bell Microproducts, Inc. v. Relational Funding Corp., No. 02 C
329, 2002 WL 31133195, at *1 (N.D. I11. Sept. 25, 2002). The court criticized
defendant's General Counsel for giving the following instructions to fellow
employees: "[Ujnless instructed otherwise, any written correspondence you

author, whether by letter, memo, Excel spreadsheet, e-mail, etc., should be

directed to my attention (at least as one of the recipients) to assure that the
attorney-client privilege is retained." Id.; see also B.F.G. ofIll., Inc., 2001 WL
1414468, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 2001). The court in B.F.G. of Illinois, Inc.

noted that the defendant "was sophisticated in its efforts to shield its
communications." Id. at *6. The first e-mail claimed to be privileged
announced a "final business decision." Id. It did not seek legal advice as
defendant had asserted, but merely instructed counsel to "approve from a legal
perspective.., and.., forward to" other people on counsel's business team.
Id. The second e-mail merely forwarded a previous e-mail sent to in-house
counsel by a corporate employee. Id. at *7. The forwarded e-mail explained
that another specified corporate employee had asked for comments on a purely
business matter. Id. When forwarding the message to the specified employee,
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practices intended to link in-house counsel to non-privileged
communications in order to complicate privilege determinations may
be ordered to pay the costs incurred by the opposing party due to
such determinations. 67 By imposing such sanctions, courts generally
seek to deter litigants from "us[ing] in-house counsel to apply
a
68
veneer of privilege to non-privileged business communications."
The above discussion indicates that e-mail facilitates
communication about both protected legal matters and non-legal
matters between in-house counsel and corporate officers and
employees. While it has always been possible for litigants to assert
scurrilous privilege claims as to non-privileged paper documents
addressed to counsel,69 such abusive tactics may have become more
pervasive with the emergence of electronic technology. 70 The
copying and forwarding functions unique to e-mail communications
provide an effortless means of concealing "smoking guns" by veiling
them behind a "smoke screen" of privilege. Even if e-mail messages
are not forwarded to attorneys for the purpose of creating a false
premise for a privilege claim, the temptation to withhold nonprivileged e-mail messages directed to or sent by corporate counsel
has grown with the overall increase in communications running to or
from corporate counsel due to e-mail. 7 '
the in-house counsel did not add any commentary whatsoever. Id.
67. Id. After determining that defendant's privilege log deceptively
characterized communications regarding business matters as privileged
documents, the court ordered that defendant pay the costs plaintiff incurred in
preparing the motion to compel. Id. But see Bell, 2002 WL 31133195, at *1.
Despite a strong indication that defendant adopted deceptive internal e-mailing

practices, the court only chastised the defendant for relying on the flimsy claim
that the mere receipt of e-mail shelters communications otherwise unworthy of
the attorney-client privilege. Id.
68. See B.F.G. ofIll., Inc., 2001 WL 1414468, at *7.
69. See 1 PAuL R. RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED
STATES § 7:2, at 24 (2d ed. 1999) (noting generally that businesses may try to
"immunize internal [business] communications from discovery by placing
legal counsel in strategic corporate positions and funneling documents through

counsel").
70. In fact, many of the cases addressing the attorney-client privilege

asserted as to e-mail messages involve unpersuasive claims. See cases cited
supra notes 55-56.
71. See B.F.G. of ill., Inc., 2001 WL 1414468, at *4 ("[I]n-house counsel
and litigation counsel" have "an important professional responsibility.., to
police the anticipatable desire of corporations to shield as much as possible
from their adversaries in litigation.").
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Nonetheless, the deeply entrenched precedent of construing
privileges narrowly 72 encourages courts to peer behind the curtain of
issue.73
privilege to ascertain the true nature of the e-mail at
Additionally, courts' power to impose sanctions on unscrupulous
litigants, although infrequently wielded, constitutes an important
potential deterrent of the manipulation74 of electronic communications
to abuse the attorney-client privilege.
b. Voice mail

Voice mail has been described as the "next frontier in electronic
discovery." 75 Forecasts that voice mail will emerge as an abundant
and potent source of discovery are based on cutting edge
technological developments in information technology that will
improve voice mail retention 76 and simplify searches of the
medium.77
72. See Lewis v. UNUM Corp. Severance Plan, 203 F.R.D. 615, 618 (D.
Kan. 2001) (noting that the attorney-client privilege "is to be extended no more
broadly than necessary to effectuate its purpose").
73. In this respect, the power to require parties to submit contested
electronic communications to the court for in camera inspection is
indispensable to the truth seeking function of the adversarial system.
74. See B.F.G. ofIll., Inc., 2001 WL 1414468, at *7.
75. Paul D. Boynton, Voice mail Poised to Become the Next Target
of E-Discovery, http://www.lexisone.com/news/nlibrary/lw070003z.html (last
visited Feb. 21, 2005); see also Ron Madden et al., Caught on Tape: The Next
Frontier in Electronic Discovery, LEGAL TECH NEWSLETTER (May 2004),
http://www.lawjournalnewsletters.com/issues/ljnlegaltech/cgibin/udt/im.displa
y.printable?; Steven C. Bennett, Voice mail: The Latest Front in the EDiscovery Wars, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id= 1036630451049.
76. See Madden et al., supra note 75. United Message Systems (UMS) have
evolved to the point where digitalized e-mail and voice mail systems are
rapidly converging. Id. This has improved the capacity for retention of voice
mails. Id. Voice mail systems may have the capacity to retain all voice mail
messages. See Bennett, supra note 75. But see Alexander v. F.B.I., 186
F.R.D. 148, 153 (D.D.C. 1999) (describing the retention capacity of the voice
mail system in place at the White House as late as 1998 and indicating that
unopened voice mail was erased after only ten days while opened voice mail
was erased after only fifteen days).
77. Voice mail has always been a problematic target for discovery
considering that it is not searchable and, therefore, must be screened aurally.
See Madden et al., supra note 75. However, several UMS providers appear to
be developing technologies that will permit text searches of voice recordings.
Id. Such capabilities "will enable litigation teams to quickly review voice files
for privilege and keep out what is not necessary (and possibly damaging to the
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Currently, federal case law addressing discovery disputes over
electronically stored voice mail is extremely scant.7 8 "However,
there is nothing in theory and little in substance to distinguish these
forms of communication from e-mail... for the purposes of
discovery." 79 Several courts have indicated that discoverable
electronically stored data includes voice mail.8° Moreover, other
81
courts have issued rulings based on the same implicit premise.
Courts have employed the same procedures for determining whether
voice mail is privileged as they would in analyzing other types of
communications. 82 Insofar as voice mail satisfies the elements of
applicable privileges, it will receive protection comparable to that
accorded to other types of privileged communications.
client) from being entered into evidence just as easily as other electronic
documents." Id. On the other hand, "the requesting party will now be able to
quickly locate audio, which may reveal the 'smoking gun'." Id.
78. As recently as December 1999, Kenneth Withers stated that "[v]oice
mail is only mentioned occasionally in the literature, and there are no instances
cited in which it has actually been disclosed in discovery." Kenneth J. Withers,
Is Digital Different? Electronic Disclosure and Discovery in Civil Litigation,
(Dec. 30, 1999), at http://www.kenwithers.com/articles/bileta/elecdisc.htm
(last updated Oct. 19, 2004).
79. Id.
80. See Thompson v. U.S. Dept. of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 96

(D. Md. 2003) ("[T]he scope of what is included in the phrase 'electronic

records' ... encompass[es] voice mail."); Kleiner v. Bums, 48 Fed. R. Serv 3d
(West) 644, 649 (D. Kan. 2000) ("[C]omputerized data and other
electronically-recorded information includes.., voice mail messages and
files, [and] back-up voice mail files.") (internal quotations omitted).
81. See Bayer Corp. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1111,
1121 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (ordering an employee of defendant to "transcribe or

otherwise preserve all voicemails that he receives.., and they too must be
produced [to plaintiff for in preparation for his deposition]"); see also Lewis v.

UNUM Corp. Severance Plan, 203 F.R.D. 615, 617 (D. Kan. 2001) (reviewing
in camera transcriptions of voice mails claimed to be privileged).
82. See Lewis, 203 F.R.D. at 617. The plaintiff sought to compel discovery
of a voice mail sent by one of defendant's company representatives to
defendant's in-house counsel. Id. To determine whether the voice mail was
protected by the attorney-client privilege, the court reviewed a transcript of the
voice mail in camera. Id.; see also Coastline Terminals of Conn., Inc. v. U.S.
Steel Corp., 221 F.R.D. 14, 17-18 (D. Kan. 2001) (reviewing in camera a
transcript of an allegedly privileged voice mail).
83. See Lewis, 203 F.R.D. at 621-622 (determining that a voice mail sent
by defendant's company representative to defendant's in-house counsel
"relat[ed] to legal advice sought by a client and thus [was] protected by the
attorney-client privilege"); see also Coastline Terminals of Conn., 221 F.R.D.
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c. Expectation of confidentiality
It has been observed that e-mail and voice mail engender
communications that are less formal than a written letter. 84 E-mail
messages are often infused with a frankness that is a common
characteristic of instantaneous communication by phone or in
person. 8 5
This is in part due to an overestimation of the
confidentiality associated with e-mail messages. 86 The unguarded
nature of many e-mail communications renders such evidence an
extremely persuasive at trial. 8 7 Furthermore, because e-mail and
at 17-18 (finding that a voice mail was not privileged because it was "[s]imply
a transmittal of factual information .... No client confidences were disclosed.

No legal opinion [was] sought or given."); Doeble v. Sprint Corp., No. CIV
00-2053-KHV, 2001 WL 392513, at *1 (D. Kan. Apr. 10, 2001) (analyzing
plaintiffs motion for protective order seeking to postpone discovery of voice
mails until after depositions under FRCP 26(c)(2) and 26(d), which permit
courts to regulate sequence of discovery to promote fair litigation practices).
84. See Kenneth J. Withers, Self-Deleting E-mail: A Self-Delusion,
http://www.kenwithers.com/articles/index.html ("[D]espite a decade of highprofile e-mail gaffs... people churned out embarrassing and selfincriminating electronic messages at a dizzying rate.... .'[T]he real lesson
corporate America is taking away from the Microsoft antitrust trial is that old
e-mail can be a mine field of legal liability, not to mention a source of public
embarrassment."') (quoting Amy Harmon, CorporateDelete Keys Busy as Email Turns up in Court,NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 11, 1998, at Al); Stephen D.
Williger & Robin M. Wilson, Negotiating the Minefields of Electronic
Discovery, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 52, 27 (2004), at http://law.richmond.edu/

joltlvl0i5/article52.pdf ("Employees need to be educated to be mindful of the
contents of all electronic documents-especially, but not exclusively, e-mail,
text messaging, and other seemingly 'informal' means of communication.").
85. See Mark D. Robins, Computers and the Discovery of Evidence-A
New Dimension to Civil Procedure, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L.
411, 416 (1999) ("Because users do not expect the information entered into
many of these formats ever to be put in hard copy, this information is likely to
be less guarded and, therefore, more revealing and potentially damaging.
Perhaps the best example of this phenomenon is the notoriously relaxed
attitude of e-mail users whose spontaneity appears to be inspired by an
instantaneous and seemingly private form of communication in which the
presence of the interlocutor is not felt."); Madden et al., supra note 75 ("Voicemail has traditionally been the most personalized and candid form of
communication in business.").
86. See Withers, supra note 37. Perhaps this frankness is due to the false
perception by electronic technology users that electronic evidence is not "'real'
because the evidence was never reduced to paper form, nor is it even
susceptible to being printed out." Id. at iv.
87. See, e.g., Owens v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 96 Civ. 9747 DLC,
1997 WL 793004 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 1997) (addressing the racist comment
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voice mail facilitate the candid exchange of information, they have
the potential to significantly enhance the quality of legal
representation by increasing the amount of information available to
an attorney.
For the above reasons, privileged electronic
communications require at least the same degree of protection as is
afforded to paper based documents. Any comparative reduction in
protection of electronic communication will undercut the utility of
e-mail and voice mail as effective communicative tools for potential
litigants.
On the other hand, there is an argument that electronic
communications create a lower expectation of confidentiality than
communications made in person, by phone or by traditional mail.88
"Private, or internal, e-mail systems.., do not create the potential
for inadvertent waiver of the attorney-client privilege through the
disclosure of confidential information because, by their private
nature, the communications never [have to] leave the building
and... never [have to] actually [be] disclosed. 89 In contrast,
"[p]ublic e-mail systems using the Internet... invoke a host of
concerns over the confidentiality and security of e-mail
communications between attorney and client." 90 Such concerns have
led to a debate over whether attorneys should use encryption
that was sent through company e-mail system and gave rise to employment
discrimination lawsuit); Strauss v. Microsoft Corp., 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1576 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), 91 Civ. 5928 SWK, 1995 WL 326492
(S.D.N.Y. June 1, 1995) (finding inappropriate e-mail messages sent by
supervisor were probative evidence in retaliatory discharge case); Siemens
Solar Indus. v. Atl. Richfield Co., No. 93 Civ. 1126 LAP, 1994 WL 86368
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 1994) (finding defendant's e-mail contradicted theory of its
defense); see also Madden et al., supranote 75 ("Even with the proliferation of
e-mail and other electronic documents, voice mail continues to have a greater
impact on juries and judges."); Bennett, supra note 75 ("Voicemail evidence is
powerful. Even beyond e-mail, where informal, often ill-considered messages
can produce damning admission, the actual sound of an oral message can
literally make or break a case.").
88. See Mathew J. Boettcher & Eric G. Tucciarone, Concerns Over
Attorney-Client Communication Through E-Mail: Is the Sky Really Falling?,
2002 L. REv. MICH. STATE UNIV. DETROIT C. LAW 127, 128 (Spring 2002)
(commenting that "attorneys and judges alike have not been so quick to afford
e-mail communications the same level of respect and protection" that they

would give to more traditional means of communications).
89. Id. at 130.
90. Id.
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programs to prevent privileged communications from being denied
protection either because of a finding that the requisite
confidentiality was lacking or because of waiver. Considering that
many corporations employing in-house counsel operate internal
e-mail systems, the reduced confidentiality of e-mail messages
would appear to affect private individuals more than corporations.
Nonetheless, several court opinions addressing the expectation of
privacy in e-mail messages sent via the Internet have indicated that
e-mail communications are sufficiently secure to preserve the
attorney-client privilege. 9 1 Attorneys should, however, adhere to
clients' preferences 92with respect to means of communicating
sensitive information.
2. The Work Product Doctrine
The work product doctrine shields from discovery material
"prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial" 93 by or for a party
or its representative, including but not limited to that party's
attorney. 9 Generally, the goal of the work product doctrine is to
91. See United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 418 (1996) ("The [e-mail]
sender enjoys a reasonable expectation that the initial transmission will not be
intercepted by the police. The fact that an unauthorized 'hacker' might
intercept an e-mail message does not diminish the legitimate expectation of
privacy in any way.").
A lawyer may transmit information relating to the representation of a
client by unencrypted e-mail sent over the Internet without violating
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1998) because the mode of
transmission affords a reasonable expectation of privacy from a
technological and legal standpoint. The same privacy accorded U.S.
and commercial mail, land-line telephonic transmissions, and
facsimiles applies to Internet e-mail.
ABA Comm.on Ethics & Prof 1Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 (1999).

92. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof 1Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413

(1999) ("A lawyer should consult with the client and follow her instructions,
however, as to the mode of transmitting highly sensitive information relating to

the client's representation.").
93. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
94. See Portis v. City of Chicago, No. 02 C 3139, 2004 WL 1535854, at *2
(N.D. Ill. July 7, 2004) (announcing the definition of and principles behind the

work product doctrine in the context of plaintiffs opposition to defendant's

motion to compel production of a database compiled by plaintiff); United
States v. Stewart, 287 F. Supp. 2d 461, 465 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2003) (applying
the work product doctrine in a criminal case and concluding that an e-mail by
defendant to her attorney in preparation of trial was privileged despite its
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"preserve a zone of privacy in which a lawyer can prepare and
develop legal theories and strategy 'with an eye toward litigation'
free from unnecessary intrusion by his adversaries." 95 The work
product doctrine is perhaps even more strongly implicated in
In fact,
electronic discovery than in traditional discovery.
"[c]omputers... enable users [including attorneys] to create
summaries, indices, and methods of organizing vast quantities of
information. ' 96 Attorneys, like other professionals, increasingly rely
on computers to manage information and records relating to their
cases. 9 7 Considering the utility of electronic data compilations and
the costs associated with creating them, parties are eager to discover
litigation databases created by opposing counsel. For the same
invoke the work
reason, attorneys in possession of such databases
98
product doctrine to shield them from discovery.
While attorney work product that reveals the "mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an
attorney... concerning the litigation" 99 is entitled to almost absolute
protection, work product that does not can be disclosed "upon a
showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the
materials in the preparation of the party's case and that the party is
unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of
the materials by other means."' 100 These general principles developed
in the context of paper discovery apply to electronic documents as
well.

predominantly factual content); Eagle Compressors, Inc. v. Hec Liquidating
Corp., 206 F.R.D. 474, 478 (N.D. Ill. 2002); see also Scovish v. Upjohn Co.,
15 Conn. L. Rptr. 446 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1995), No. 5256520, 1995 WL
731755, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 22, 1995) (defining work product in the
context of defendant's opposition to plaintiff's motion to compel production of
database compiled by defendant).

95. United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1196 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947)); see Portis, 2004 WL 1535854,
at *2; Stewart, 287 F. Supp. 2d 461, 466; Eagle Compressors,Inc., 206 F.R.D.
at 478.
96. Robins, supra note 85, at 414.
97. See Bennett, supra note 75.
98. See Portis, 2004 WL 1535854 at *1 (opposing a motion to compel a
litigation database).
99. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 398 n.7 (1981).
100. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
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a. Litigation databases
Electronic work product such as computer files and database
compilations often consists of aggregations of factual information
that is either entitled to qualified protection as ordinary work product
or no protection at all. However, as in the case of paper work
product that appears in the first instance to be ordinary, electronic
data may constitute opinion work product if, due to the manner in
which they are compiled, they would reveal the legal theories and
strategies that an attorney is pursuing.' 0 ' For example, computer
databases prepared in anticipation of litigation and containing files 1of
02
a corporate litigant's personnel might not be discoverable.
Although the personnel files themselves may not qualify as work
product at all, the composition of files may nonetheless deserve
work product if it reveals the litigant's
protection as oqinion
0
plan.'
discovery
101. In determining whether electronic data compilations qualify as ordinary
work product or opinion work product, courts have looked for guidance to
Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312 (3d Cir. 1985). See Portis, 2004 WL 1535854, at
*2; Scovish v. Upjohn Co., 15 Conn. L. Rptr. 446 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1995), No.
526520, 1995 WL 731755, at *2-3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 22, 1995). In
Sporck, the issue was whether an attorney's selection and compilation of

documents for his client to review in preparation for his deposition constituted
opinion work product. Sporck, 759 F.2d at 315. The court held that "[i]n

selecting and ordering a few documents out of thousands counsel could not
help but reveal important aspects of his understanding of the case. Indeed, in a
case such as this.., the process of selection and distillation is often more
critical than pure legal research." Id. at 316.
A court also cited Washington Bancorporation v. Said, 145 F.R.D. 274
(D.D.C. 1992), in an attempt to resolve a work product claim involving an
electronic database. See Portis, 2004 WL 1535854, at *2. In Washington
Bancorporation, an attorney created an index cataloging 2,400 boxes of
documents. 145 F.R.D. at 278. Although the index could be considered a
hybrid of fact and opinion work product, the court in Washington
Bancorporation was not concerned that the attorney's strategy of the case
would be revealed because it was "not selective enough." Id. at 276-77.
102. See Hoffman v. United Telecomm., Inc., 117 F.R.D. 436, 439 (D. Kan.
1987).
103. Id.
Plaintiffs moved to compel defendant to answer several

interrogatories requesting detailed information regarding a computer file set up

by defendant for the purpose of defending a sex discrimination claim. Id. The

computer file contained information regarding defendant's personnel records.
Id. The court noted that it had previously protected discovery of the physical
computer tape containing the file. Id. In this particular instance, even
collateral information regarding the computer file was protected under the
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On the other hand, courts have suggested that protection of
litigation databases as opinion work product will only be granted
under exceptional circumstances, as the general rule provides that
information that would not be protected if it remained in a client's
hands do not acquire work product protection merely because they
are transferred to counsel. 10 4 Considering that databases are usually
created for the management of large amounts of information, they
are less likely than a discrete selection of paper documents to reveal
opinion work product. 10 5 As a result, even where a database
constitutes a hybrid of fact and opinion work product, courts may
order its production upon an adequate showing of need by the
discovering party. 106 In such cases, the volume of data is a crucial
factor in determining whether access to an electronic database will
enable a discovering party to discern the litigation strategies of
opposing counsel. 107 Another significant factor may be the objective
work product doctrine because the interrogatories required, in effect, an
explanation of defendant's discovery plan. Id.
104. See Scovish, 1995 WL 731755, at *3 ("The narrow exception.., that
the selection and compilation of documents by counsel for litigation purposes
is protected opinion work-product, may be applicable, but its application
depends upon the real, rather than speculative, concern that the thought process
of... counsel in relation to... anticipated litigation would be exposed."
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Gould v. Mitusi Mining & Smelting Co., 825 F.2d
676, 679-80 (2d Cir. 1987))).
105. See Robins, supra note 85, at 414. ("Not only do computers generate,
sort, and store vast amounts of information useful to litigators, but they also
provide a source of information that may not exist in paper form.").
106. See Portis, 2004 WL 1535854, at *1. An attorney for plaintiff
compiled a database from the city's computer, from hard copies of arrest
reports produced by the city. Id. The defendant was invited but declined to
contribute to the creation of the data compilation then moved to compel
production of the data. Id. Although the court recognized that the database
compilation contained fact and opinion work product, the court determined that
the production of the database would not necessarily reveal plaintiffs
counsel's mental impressions, opinions and legal strategies. See id.; see also
In re Chrysler Motors Corp., 860 F.2d 844, 846 (8th Cir. 1988). The court
found that a database of relevant evidence prepared by an attorney was merely
ordinary work product which did not reveal counsel's mental impressions. Id.
The court in In re ChryslerMotors Corp. further noted that opposing counsel
had demonstrated a need for the database information and that the replication
of the database would involve duplication of effort and considerable delay and
expense. Id. Ultimately, the court resolved the discovery dispute on grounds
of waiver due to voluntary disclosure Id.
107. See Portis,2004 WL 1535854, at *3. The court based its determination
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or subjective nature of the data. 10 8 To the extent that a database
contains written subjective comments as to the strategy behind the
selection of documents, such comments constitute opinion work
product which can be redacted from the material. 109
b. Legal research databases

The search terms employed by attorneys to find relevant law and
ualify as opinion work product
to develop a theory of a case may q1
Moreover, the compilation of
and be protected against discovery.'
results that such search terms elicit from legal databases is also
entitled to protection as opinion work product even if each
11 separate
result may not reveal the mental impression of an attorney.
that a litigation database would not reveal the impressions of the attorney on
the abundance of arrest records that had been compiled (20,000 records). Id.
The aggregation of such a large number of documents obscured opposing
counsel's ability to discern any discrete strategy developed by the producing
party's attorney. Id.; see also Scovish, 1995 WL 731755, at *3.The plaintiff
in Scovish sought to discover a database prepared by defendant's attorney that
referenced and indexed a large number of documents. Id. at * 1. The court
concluded that because of the vast amount of documents referenced in
defendant's database (a printout of which would exceed 100,000 pages), it
would be highly unlikely that defense attorney's mental impressions would be
exposed by production. Id. at * 1-*3.
108. See Minnesota v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. CX-95-2536, 1995 WL
862582, at *1 (Minn. App. Dec. 26, 1995). The court rejected a attorney's
claim that production of his client's litigation database would reveal his
strategies. Id. The court based its determination, in part, on a finding that "the
computerized databases include fields containing objective information." Id.
109. See Scovish, 1995 WL 731755, at *4. It is unclear just how such
opinion work product would be redacted, whether by deleting it from a
computer tape copy of the database or by redacting it from the paper printout
of the database.
110. See United States v. Segal, No. 02-CR-112, 2004 WL 830428, at *8
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2004). Defendant opposed discovery of four e-mail
communications containing judicial opinions transmitted by co-defendant's
general counsel to herself from Lexis-Nexis. Id. The court agreed with the
defendant that "[t]he search terms used to gather [the] cases... provide a
window into the attorney's thinking." Id. Although the search was performed
before litigation commenced, "[t]he search terms closely relate[d] to the
subject matter of the present litigation and indicate that [the] General Counsel
was researching the claims at the heart of the present litigation." Id.
111. See Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., 143 F.R.D. 611, 624
(E.D.N.C. 1992). The court shielded from discovery the printed results of an
electronic database search conducted in Nexis and Dialog at the request of
counsel. Id. The court determined that "although the documents themselves
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In rare instances, a party may maintain its own legal research
112
system comprised of legislative materials and judicial opinions.
Such databases are generally not discoverable-not because they
qualify as opinion work product, but because they constitute a
collection of the law. 113 As discovery is a procedural tool for the
gathering of facts, it cannot be used to extract the law from opposing
counsel."14 In the interest of efficiency and economy, however, a
court may encourage counsel to run a search according to criteria
designated by opposing counsel."15
The foregoing discussion regarding both attorney compiled and
legal research databases demonstrates the potential for electronic
data to be manipulated in ways that facilitate trial preparation for
attorneys. It appears that compilation of databases for litigation
purposes is usually undertaken by large corporate or governmental
defendants attempting to determine the existence or extent of
liability. Whether the party opposing discovery of a database
compilation will prevail under the attorney work product doctrine
[were] not privileged, the compilation of documents reflect[ed] the attorney's

legal theory and thought processes concerning anticipated litigation." Id.
112. See Ind. Coal Council v. Hodel, 118 F.R.D. 264 (D.D.C. 1988).
113. See id. at 265. Plaintiff appealed to the district court from the order of
the Magistrate. Id. The order denied a motion to compel Defendants to allow
Plaintiff access to "COALEX," a legal research system containing 5,000 pages
of legislative history, information regarding federal and state regulatory
programs and judicial decisions. Id. The court rejected the magistrate judge's
finding that COALEX was a "confidential research system" entitled to
qualified privilege under FED. R. Crv. P. 26(c)(7). Id. at 266. The court
explained that all of the data that was searcheable by COALEX was publicly
accessible and, therefore, could not be considered "confidential research." Id.
Furthermore, the court denied that the discovery request implicated the work
product doctrine. Id. at 267. Instead, the court held COALEX was not
discoverable, considering that it was a compilation of legal rather than factual
information. Id. However, in the end the court concluded that in the interest
of efficiency and economy, the plaintiff could request that defendant run a
search according to criteria selected by plaintiff. Id. at 268.
114. See id. at 267. "The Federal Rules are designed to provide parties
access to the [facts] but not the [law]." Id. The court considered the discovery
request to be analogous to one seeking an order to compel opposing counsel to
make available for review his superior collection of reporters. Id. at 268.
115. Id. (observing that defendant's legal research database was a "highly
valuable legal research tool and in the interests of the efficient administration
of justice, defendants' reluctance... [to reach a mutual agreement] to conduct
limited search requests for the plaintiffs ...seem[ed] wholly unreasonable").

Summer 2005]

1711

PRIVILEGE & THE ECPA

seemingly depends on two main factors: (1) the extent to which the
volume of the data facilitates or prevents revelation of the preparing
attorney's mental processes and (2) the extent to which the nature of
the data exposes or obfuscates the attorney's legal strategies.
Production of litigation databases becomes more likely as the amount
of data hampers the ability to "extrapolate backwards from the
results of a selection process to determine the reason a document was
selected, ' 16 and as "the process of selecting the data becomes
increasingly mechanical."" 17 Alternatively:
[T]he more that a database's design reflects judgments of
counsel relating to anticipated litigation, such as by
selecting portions of documents for inclusion based on
judgments of counsel as to their importance to the litigation,
by arranging documents based on strategic priorities, and by
using indices that relate to litigation needs, the more likely
that database is to be protected from discovery by work
product immunity. 18
C. Threats to EvidentiaryPrivileges That Are
Unresolved by the FederalRules of Civil Procedure
and Increasedby ElectronicDiscovery
1. Unique Characteristics of Electronic Data and
Their Practical Effects on Electronic Discovery
a. Volume
For purposes of the discovery process, electronic data differ in a
number of ways from information that is recorded on paper. The
most notable difference that affects privilege is the sheer volume of
data that can be stored electronically. 19 Although traditional paper
116. Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 319 (3d Cir. 1985) (Seitz, J., dissenting).
117. See Robins, supra note 85, at 433 (1999) (citing 8A CHARLES A.
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL

§ 2218 (2d ed.

1994)).
118. Id.
119. See Wiginton v. C.B. Richard Ellis, Inc. No. 02 C 6832, 2004 WL
Aug. 10, 2004) ("As contrasted with traditional paper
1895122, at *3 (N.D. 11.
discovery, e-discovery has the potential to be vastly more expensive due to the
sheer volume of electronic information that can be easily and inexpensively
stored on backup media."); Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 56
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discovery can often involve large volumes of paper documents,
electronic data systems have drastically increased the frequency with
which documents are created and the volume of documents that are
Because parties are
retained by individuals and corporations.'
generally charged with the responsibility of identifying which of
their own documents are privileged,12 ' any increase in number of
documents renders the privilege screening process more arduous and
creates a greater statistical likelihood of22 error, resulting in
inadvertent disclosure of privileged materials.'
b. Difficulty of deletion andproliferation

In contrast to paper documents, deletion of electronic documents
may render the document more difficult to locate, though it usually
does not irretrievably destroy the document. 123 Thus, a party has
Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 1159, 1162 (W.D. Tenn. 2003). For example, the
defendant in Medtronic requested the production of, among other electronic
data, 993 backup tapes allegedly containing 61 terabytes. Id. The court noted
it would take approximately 728,178 standard 3.5 inch diskettes to store one
terabyte of data. Id. n.3; see also MICHELE C.S. LANGE & KRISTIN M.
NIMSGER, ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE AND DISCOVERY: WHAT EVERY LAWYER

SHOULD KNOW, 48 (2004) ("Electronic records present the problem of extreme
volume that was previously unseen in the paper world."); Robins, supra note
85, at 416. ("[C]omputers offer a window on a broader spectrum of
information than is traditionally recorded in printed documents.").
120. See Ronald J. Hedges, U.S. Mag. J., Discovery of Digital Information,
at 1-2 (Sept. 27, 2004) ("Chief among [the] differences [between digital and
paper discovery] is the sheer volume of electronic information."),
http://www.kenwithers.com/articles/hedges092704.pdf (last updated Oct. 19,
2004); Withers, supra note 78 ("The numbers of electronic records that may be
subject to discovery are reported to be huge, even in cases involving parties of
relatively modest size.").
121. See Shira A. Scheindlin & Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in
Federal Civil Litigation:Is Rule 34 Up to the Task?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 327, 368
(1999).
122. See Medtronic, 56 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) at 1177 (noting that the
discovery plan involved a large quantity which rendered more likely the
possibility of inadvertent disclosures); LANGE AND NIMSGER, supra note 119,
at 48 (noting that where multiple reviewers screen tens of thousands or even
millions of documents, "there is bound to be differences in judgment as to
whether a particular document is privileged or responsive. The sheer volume of
documents reviewed in a certain day can allow privileged documents to slip by
unnoticed into the production set.").
123. See Withers, supra note 84.
Thoughtlessly worded e-mail messages... cannot be destroyed, no
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sought to destroy a privileged electronic communication to ensure its
confidentiality still must be concerned about the possibility of
unintentionally producing copies of the document retained by the
computer system. 124 Similarly, proliferation of electronic files in a
computer system may create a situation where there are multiple
copies of an electronic document in a computer, all of which must be
identified and withheld.1 25 The proliferation of electronic documents
renders the privilege screening process more difficult in two ways.
First, it augments the number of documents that must be screened for
privilege, increasing the burden imposed by privilege review.' 26 In
order to identify all copies of a privileged electronic document,
litigants perform a procedure known as "de-duplication."' 127 Second,
matter how hard the author or recipient hits the "delete" key. E-mail
is often backed-up on intermediary computers or network servers as a
routine matter, and the back-up media may be kept indefinitely. The
process of "deleting" seldom erases a computer file; it merely marks
the file for overwriting if space is needed on the disk (which in these
days of multi-gigabyte storage capacity, is almost never).
124. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (S.D. Cal.
1999). Although defendant customarily deleted e-mail soon after sending or
receiving it, the court ordered her to resurrect and produce the e-mail
communications, finding it implausible that they were irretrievable. Id. at
1051, 1054, 1058. Defendant was concerned that some of the recovered e-mail
would reveal attorney-client communications and private material. Id. at 1054.
125. See Steven C. Bennett, E-Discovery by Keyword Search, 15 PRAC.
LITIGATOR, May 2004. ("An e-mail from a lawyer to a business executive, for
example, may be duplicated and forwarded to other business executives. As a
result, there may be multiple copies of the same message, all conceivably
privileged.").
126. See Hedges, supra note 120, at 2 ("[C]omputers have the ability to
capture several copies (or drafts) of the same e-mail, thus multiplying the
volume of documents. All of these e-mails must be scanned for both relevance
and privilege.").
127. See Wiginton v. C.B. Richard Ellis, Inc., No. 02 C 6832, 2004 WL
1895122, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 2004) (noting that de-duplication is a
"process whereby documents which appear in a user's mailbox on multiple
days are not counted as multiple hits. For example, if the same e-mail
appeared in an inbox over a period of several months, only one copy of the
document would be produced."); see also Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v.
Michelson, 56 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 1159, 1160 (W.D. Tenn. 2003). The
court acknowledged in Medironic that duplication could complicate and
impede the document review. See id. Accordingly, the fact that discovery
involved large volumes of data on multiple tapes required that "the restored
files from each tape... be compared to the restored files from every other tape
and duplicates eliminated .... The de-duplication and conversion are required
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a person performing a privilege review may gain a false sense of
security when that person identifies one copy of the privileged
communication. 128 However, the successful identification of one
copy of a privileged electronic communication will not protect [from
29
disclosure] all copies that remain lurking in a computer system. 1
c. Metadata
Unlike paper documents, electronic documents often contain
data that are not represented within their four comers, such as
attached documents that do not appear in a paper copy when
generated. 130 Review of the electronic document alone will not
guarantee that all data associated with the document were screened
for privilege. 13' Although
[m]any common electronic file formats provide rudimentary
search capabilities with "find" features that enable users to
locate words or terms within a document..., these abilities
are limited to searches within the same file format. A user
cannot, for example, search through e-mail messages132and
their attachments at the same time in native file format.
so that large volumes of data in different formats may be searched in a
reasonable time." Id.
128. See United States v. Stewart, 287 F. Supp. 2d 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Defendant sent a privileged e-mail to her attorney and later forwarded the same
e-mail to her daughter. Id. at 463. Both e-mail communications were listed in
the privilege log accompanying the documents produced in paper form. Id.
However, on the privilege log accompanying the production of electronic data,
defense attorney listed the first e-mail, but he inadvertently omitted the second
e-mail communication from the privilege log. Id. He then disclosed it in
production. Id. at 463-64.
129. See id. at 464.
130. See 7 MOORE ETAL.supranote45, § 37A.01.
131. See United States v. KPMG LLP, No. 02-0295 (TFH), 2003 WL
22336072, at *5 (D.D.C. Oct., 10, 2003). In this case, although certain e-mail
messages were not subject to the attorney-client privilege, the attached
documents were. Id. Thus, a review of the e-mail alone would not have
identified the privileged nature of the attachment. See also Doe v. Ashcroft,
334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 508-509 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting that "production of
[metadata such as] e-mail header information, including subject lines...
conceivably may reveal information protected by the... attorney-client
privilege, e.g., a communication with an attorney where the subject line
conveys privileged or possibly incriminating information").
132. Kenneth J. Withers, Considerationsfor Selecting a Form of Production
for Electronic Discovery, THE E-DISCOVERY STANDARD, Summer 2004, at 5
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Thus, ensuring that privileged information contained in an attached
document is not produced may require the opening and reviewing of
all attachments. 133 A more technologically savvy way to resolve this
problem is by enabling searches across multiple original file formats
by transforming electronic documents to a common file type34such as
PDF or TIFF, and then indexing their full text for searching.1
d. Resurrection

Finally, where compliance with a discovery request requires the
restoration of data that are not presently stored on computer hard
drives, but on computer backup tapes, the organization of the data
may not be conducive to a systematic document review.1 35 The
reason for the discrepancy inheres in the very purpose for creating
backup copies-to prevent the irretrievable loss of data as a result of
a computer system crash. In order to store the data contained in an
entire computer system on a backup tape, the data are compiled so as
to maximize the storae space rather than to facilitate accessibility of
Thus, whereas paper discovery is facilitated
files and documents.
n. 1, available at http://www.kenwithers.com/articles/adssum04.pdf (last
updated Oct. 19, 2004). See Michael M. Wechsler & Michele C.S. Lange,

Today's Discovery Demands Require Proficiency in Searching Electronic
Documents, N.Y. ST. B. Assoc., Mar./Apr., 2004, at 22 (explaining that
keyword searches across native documents "usually do not search e-mail
attachments as well [as e-mail messages]").
133. See Wechsler & Lange, supra note 132, at 22 ("Locating and viewing
keywords sought typically requires opening each document in its native
application and then searching to find the instances of each keyword.").
134. See Withers, supra note 132, at 5; see also Rowe Entm't. Inc. v.
William Morris Agency Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). The
defendant in Rowe Entertainmentproposed that e-mail attachments containing

word processing documents could be converted into Tagged Image File Format

or "TIFF" files. Id. at 425. According to the defendant, this process would be
necessary in order to make redactions. Id.; see also Chris O'Reilly & Jason
Derting, Technolawyer.com: True Electronic Discovery Has Come of Age,
LAWYERS J., Jan. 24, 2003, at 4 ("Once the documents have been converted to
TIFF images... you can search across ...attachments.").

135. See Wiginton v. C.B. Richard Ellis, Inc., No. 02 C 6832, 2004 WL
1895122, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 2004) ("Depending on how the electronic
data is stored, it can be difficult.., to retrieve the data and search it for
relevant [or privileged] documents.").
136. See Hagemeyer N. Am. v. Gateway Data Sci. Corp., 222 F.R.D. 594,
599 (E.D. Wisc. 2004) ("The data on a backup tape are not organized for
retrieval of individual documents or files, but for wholesale, emergency
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by business operations' general practices of filing and organizing
paper documents according to one or more consistent themes such as
subject matter and chronology, electronic records137stored on backup
tapes are not oriented in the same logical manner.
These differences between electronic and paper documents are
particularly relevant to parties' preservation of their evidentiary
privileges. In fact, inasmuch as the above characteristics generally
increase the volume of information contained in electronic databases,
they support the inference that there is a higher risk of unintentional
disclosure of privileged information in electronic discovery. 138 The
ultimate danger, which varies in degree depending on the
jurisdiction, is, of course, that of waiving privilege. 139
2. Traditional Methods of Protecting Privilege
Applied to Electronic Discovery
a. Rule 2669 meet and confer conference
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) requires that before a Rule
16 conference,140 the parties:
confer... to develop a proposed discovery plan that
indicates the parties' views and proposals concerning:...
(3) what changes should be made in the limitations on
discovery imposed under these rules or by local rule, and
uploading onto a computer system." (quoting Kenneth J. Withers, ComputerBased Discovery in FederalCivil Litigation, 2000 FED. CT. L. REv. 2, 5)).
137. See Massachusetts v. Ellis, Nos. 97-192, 97-562, 98-355, 97-193, 97561, 97-356, 97-563, 1999 WL 815818, at *2-4 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Aug. 27,
1999) (explaining the difficulties involved in searching resurrected data).
138. See Bennett, supra note 125, at 9 ("With vast electronic records...
there is a grave risk that some privileged records may slip through the review
process.").
139. See Withers, supra note 35, at 35.
140. Rule 16 provides in part that:
[T]he court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties...

to appear before it for a conference or conferences before trial for such

purposes as... (2) establishing early and continuing control so that
the case will not be protracted because of lack of management; [and]
(3) discouraging wasteful pretrial activities.
FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a). During any Rule 16 conference, "consideration may be
given, and the court may take appropriate action, with respect to... (6) the
control and scheduling of discovery, including orders affecting disclosures and
discovery pursuant to Rule 26." Id. 16(c).
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what other limitations should be imposed; and (4) any other
by the court under Rule 26(c)
entered
orders that should be 14
1
(c).
and
16(b)
or Rule
As applied to electronic discovery, the Rule 26 "meet and confer
should include a discussion on whether each side possesses
information in electronic form [and] whether... there exists any
This rule has been
privilege issue requiring redaction... ,,142
parties' counsel "to
to
opportunity
special
a
construed to offer
143 including
discuss issues associated with electronic discovery,"'
whether or not the inadvertent disclosure of privileged documents
should result in waiver.144
There are several kinds of protective measures that parties
should begin to discuss together at the meet and confer. Keyword
searches may be used to assist the attorney in performing the
141. Id. 26(f).
142. In re Bristol-Meyer Squibb Sec. Litig., 205 F.R.D. 437, 444 (stressing
the importance of counsels' duty to take advantage of the Rule 26(f)
conference to alert opposing counsel of the existence of electronic data and to
discuss methods and costs of privilege protection). The amendment to Rule
26(f) calls for discussion of whether the parties can agree on an approach to
See PROPOSED
production that protects against privilege waiver.
AMENDMENTS AND COMM. NOTES, supra note 38, at 6.
143. Id.; see Hon. John H. Hughes New Jersey Local Rule Mandates
Common Sense Approach, E-DISCOVERY STANDARD, Summer 2004, at 6. In
response to a question asking what the most common mistakes attorneys make
with regard to electronic discovery, Judge Hughes commented: "The biggest
problem is that lawyers discuss electronic discovery issues too generally at the
Rule 26(f) conference. They are not maximizing the benefits of the
conference. They should discuss the specifics there, including [issues such as
privilege]." See id. One judge has even expressed in an opinion his dismay
with the failure of attorneys to discuss and resolve issues regarding electronic
discovery and privilege. See Ind. Coal Council v. Hodel, 118 F.R.D. 264, 268
(D.D.C. 1988) (stating in regard to an electronic discovery dispute that "[it
was] unfortunate that... an agreement could not have been reached several
months [before] when th[e] issue was first raised").
144. In its draft amendments of the FRCP addressing electronic discovery,
the Advisory Committee proposed an alteration to Rule 26(f) that requires
parties to consider the consequences of inadvertent production of privileged
information. See PROPOSED AMENDMENTS AND COMM. NOTES, supra note 38,
at 8-9. The suggested addition to Rule 26(f) provides that the parties must
confer "to develop a proposed discovery plan that indicates the parties' views
and proposals concerning:... (4) whether, on agreement of the parties, the
court should enter an order protecting the right to assert privilege after
production of privileged information." Id.
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traditional process of privilege screening. 145 Once privileged
documents are identified, the parties can create a privilege log to
warn of the existence of privileged documents and to communicate
the basis for the claim. 146 In addition to these common precautionary
measures, the parties should discuss the consequences of inadvertent
production and the possibility of preserving privilege claims despite
inadvertent disclosure. 147 Finally "[t]he results of these discussions
' 14 8
are to be included ... in the discovery plan presented to the court."
b. Keyword searches

Although the unique characteristics of electronically stored
information renders more burdensome the task of screening for
privileged information, computer systems have features that mitigate
the negative effects of document proliferation. 149 For example,
computer features that permit the search of electronic data by
keywords or specific terms generally facilitate identification of
privileged documents. 150 In fact, "[bIroad database searches may be
145. Lisa Arent et al., E-Discovery: Preserving, Requesting & Producing
Electronic Information, 19 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 131,
167-68 (2002) ("As part and parcel of 'meet and confer,' you might...
[c]onsider methods to search for responsive information.").
146. See discussion supra Part V.A.3.
147. See Withers, supra note 35, at 32. Rather than formulating a rule which
would specify the consequence of an inadvertent disclosure of privileged
information, "the committee proposes that the parties discuss these issues,
attempt to reach agreement, and come to the court if there is need for a court
order to address ... privilege." Id.
148. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE U. S., REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMM., 6
(2004) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMM.],
http://www/uscourts.gov/rules/comment2O05/CV Aug04.pdf.
149. See Hon. John M. Facciola, Practice Tips from the Bench: Come to
Court Prepared,E-DISCOVERY STANDARD, Summer 2004, at 8 ("Many people
argue that electronic discovery is more difficult than paper discovery, but the
advantages of full-text searching, the ability to sort and organize, and other
electronic review functions make it much easier than paper review.").
150. See Bennett, supra note 125, at 11 ("[I]n a bulky electronic records
collection, keyword searching may greatly improve the efficiency of the
process."); Arent et al., supra note 145, at 168 ("Some e-mail systems have
search functions that could expedite the process; also, there may be software to
help search databases."); see also Wiginton v. C.B. Richard Ellis, Inc., No. 02
C 6832, 2004 WL 1895122, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 2004) (advocating
keyword searches as a cost effective method of performing privilege reviews
without having to examine each document).
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necessary, requiring safeguards against 15exposing
confidential or
1
scrutiny."'
opponent's
the
to
irrelevant data
At a minimum, keyword searches can be used to identify
documents that are responsive. Keyword searching may "[limit] the
scope of documents that must be reviewed,"' 52 thus, "reduc[ing] the
volume of records that need to be reviewed for privilege."' 53 For
example, a preliminary keyword search that may efficiently identify
privileged documents would target the terms "privileged" or
"confidential." It may, however, be unlikely that all privileged
electronic communications are marked by such language. 154 To
increase the chances of identifying privileged communications, more
sophisticated searches can be run that target documents containing
that
the names of attorneys, a party's in-house counsel, or issues
55
1
parties.
the
of
representation
legal
of
have been the subject
Keyword searching may, however, be fraught with technical
difficulties, especially where resurrected data are concerned. 156 For
example, if a keyword search program is not compatible with the
computer operating system, the hits may only indicate the physical
location of the file (the sector address), but not the logical location
(the file name and directory). 157 In such cases, a searcher may have
151. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 11.446 (4th ed. 2004).
152. Sidney K. Kanazawa, Rethinking Discovery and Document Retention in
the DigitalAge, 13 PRAc. LITIGATOR, Jan. 2002, at 47.
153. Bennett, supra note 125, at 11-12.

154. Furthermore, some electronic documents bearing such labels may not

actually be privileged.

For a discussion of courts' reactions to unfounded

privilege claims asserted as to e-mail, see supra Part V.B.l.a.
155. See Bennett, supra note 125, at 10 (describing how to conduct a
keyword search).
156. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., No. IP 00-9373-C B/S, MDL Docket
No. 1373, 2001 WL 34131187, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 16, 2001) ("[W]ord
search technology is not 100% accurate; for example, handwritten words and
documents which did not scan clearly may not be included in search results...
.[Where] abbreviations are commonplace... [a party] would have no way of
knowing whether they had developed a complete list of all interchangeable
terms."); see also Massachusetts v. Ellis, Nos. 97-192, 97-562, 98-355, 97-193,
97-561, 97-356, 97-563, 1999 WL 815818, at *3-4 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1999)
(recounting how technical difficulties complicated the computer expert's
keyword search).
157. See. e.g., Ellis, 1999 WL 815818 at *4. The court appointed a
computer expert to perform searches of defendant's computer server. Id. at * 1.
After resurrecting previously deleted data, the expert began a file-by-file
search of directories according to search terms pre-defined in a search warrant.
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1 58
to use the "view" function to examine responsive files visually.
Perhaps such difficulties can be avoided by restoring resurrected files
to a common format so 5that
a search program may properly seek
9

information within them.1

Thus, keyword searches constitute a tool that enables parties to
overcome the increased burden of screening large volumes of
electronic records to prevent disclosure of privileged information.
However, the capacity of searches to prevent disclosures of
privileged documents should not be overestimated. Ensuring
reasonable measures have been taken to prevent an inadvertent
disclosure may still require a manual review of all documents that
are found to be responsive. 160 In the end, the costs involved in
performing keyword searches, compounded by the costs parties may
have to incur in performing a manual privilege review, will generally
render the rotection of privilege one of the most costly endeavors of
litigation.
Id. at *3. The search only located the sector address of the hits. Id. at *4.
158. Id. Because the computer expert was unable to find a search program
that would report the logical location of documents on a Novell partition, the
expert had to resort to visually reviewing responsive files. Id.
159. See Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 56 Fed. R. Serv. 3d
(West) 1159, 1160 (W.D. Tenn. 2003). The judge warned that before
designing and applying a search program, preliminary steps must be
performed. See id. First, "[a]ll data on each backup tape must be restored...
to a format that a standard computer can read." Id. Second, restored files
"must be converted to a common format so that a search program may seek
information within them." Id.
160. See Medtronic, 56 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) at 1172; Tulip Computers
Int'l v. Dell Computer Corp., 53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 1420, 1425 (D. Del.
2002).
161. See Kenneth J. Withers, Electronic Discovery Disputes: Decisional
Guidelines, CIVIL ACTION, Summer 2004, at 6 ("To some extent technology
can ease the burden by helping counsel identify particular authors, recipients,
or terms. But in the end, attorneys will need to manually review tens of
thousands (if not millions) of e-mail messages, word-processing documents,
and other files to make privilege determinations."); see also Medtronic, 56
Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) at 1169 (acknowledging an estimate that privilege
screening alone would cost between sixteen and seventy million dollars);
Computer Assocs. Int'l Inc. v. Quest Software Inc., 56 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West)
401, 402 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (noting that the estimated cost of copying and
conducting a privilege search of eight hard drives would be between $28,000
and $40,000); Rowe Entm't, Inc. v. William Morris Agency Inc., 205 F.R.D.
421, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating that one defendant estimated the cost of
conducting a privilege review would be $250,000, while another projected a
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3. Innovations in Privilege Protection:
Stipulated Confidentiality Agreements
Because of the difficulty of protecting privileged matters in the
context of electronic discovery, litigants increasingly enter into
agreements that address the question of whether inadvertent
disclosure of a document will constitute a waiver. Among the types
of arrangements providing greater assurances against privilege
waiver are 62the "claw back" agreements and "quick peek"
agreements. 1
a. "Claw back" agreements

A "claw back" arrangement consists of an agreement between
the parties to disclose documents after a privilege review with the
understanding that they can promptly demand the return of any
privilege document that has been inadvertently disclosed. 163 "Claw
back" arrangements have become a "common practice in complex
litigation. ' 64 Before entering a protective order that sanctions a
"claw back" agreement, a court may order the parties to follow an
exacting discovery protocol.' 65 The discovery plan may divide the
task of privilege review in multiple segments, promoting a more
fluid and efficient discovery process. 166 This phased approach to

privilege review encourages the producing party to adhere to a steady
but disciplined privilege review, while allowing for an opposing
party to receive responsive material earlier and in quantities more
conducive to consistent analysis. Additionally, adherence to a
cost of $120,000).
162. For a discussion of "quick peek" arrangements, see infra Part V.C.3.b.
163. See Withers, supra note 161, at 6.
164. Withers, supra note 35, at 26. See Joseph, supra note 38 (stating it is a
"commonly-entered agreement that inadvertent production of privileged
document will not effect a waiver").
165. See Medtronic, 56 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) at 1171-76. The court
ordered discovery pursuant to a "claw back" protocol after delineating an
exhaustive discovery plan. Id. at 1176-77. The discovery plan required that
the defendant perform a keyword search using terms approved by the court or
mutually agreed upon by the parties. Id. at 1172, 1174. Defendant's next step
under the protocol was separating the files identified in the privilege search

into five sections of equal size. Id. at 1172, 1175. The defendant would then

review the files in five separate phases for responsiveness and privilege. Id. at
1173, 1175.
166. See id.
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cautious privilege screening process may justify in the eyes of the
court a protective order providing that inadvertent disclosure does
67
not constitute a waiver.1

Protective orders endorsing the "claw back" approach may
contain a provision directing that any documents produced by a party
after the privilege review be marked "Confidential-Attorneys' Eyes
Only."' 168 The court should include instructions that "[t]he deliberate
or inadvertent disclosure of any document to... an expert or vendor
169
does not waive privilege with regard to that document."'
Additionally, the court may direct the receiving party to notify the
producing party immediately of any document that appears to be
privileged, whereupon the producing party should promptly respond
by indicating whether or not privilege is asserted with respect to that
0
document. 17

b. "Quick peek" agreements

Perhaps the most controversial of the stipulated agreements
between the parties is one enabling the opposing party to review the
producing party's documents for relevance before any privilege
review has taken place.' 71 Under this type of agreement, the
responding party engages in a privilege review of a reduced amount
of documents after the requesting party has taken a "quick peek" of
the electronic documents and has identified those that are
responsive. 172 The "quick peek" approach to electronic discovery
167. See id. at 1177 (noting that "[glood cause exists [for the protective

order] because the volume of data that will be produced by electronic
discovery will make it difficult for the producing party to identify with
certainty every potentially privileged document prior to production").
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
17 1. This type of agreement is still very rare and has been referred to as
"esoteric." See Joseph, supra note 38; see also Withers, supra note 35, at 37
(describing the "quick peek" arrangement as a "sort of procedural high-wire
act... [requiring] an extremely high level of trust between the parties").
172. See Rowe Entm't, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421,
432-33 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). The court proposed Defendant make hard drives and
backup tapes available to Plaintiff for mirror imaging. Id. at 433. Plaintiff, in
possession of the requested e-mail messages, would then perform word
searches using terms mutually agreeable to the parties. Id. Plaintiff would
review e-mail messages identified by the search for relevance on an
"attomey's-eyes-only basis." Id. At this point, the court indicated that
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reduces costs for the producing party by placing the initial burden of
identifying relevant documents on the opposing party. 173 For this
reason, the court may develop a "quick peek" proposal in response to
a producing party's argument that compliance with opposing party's
discovery request is unduly burdensome due to the costs of privilege
review. 174
The feasibility of the "quick peek" arrangement depends largely,
even more so than in the "claw back" context, on the court's
provision of a protective order preventing against waiver by
voluntary disclosure of documents. 175 Courts have, however,
recognized that they cannot compel parties to adhere to a "quick
peek" arrangement, noting protective orders may be an inadequate
substitute for privilege reviews.1 76 Thus, a court may suggest the
"quick peek" option as merely a "set of guidelines."' 77 Accordingly,
courts may allow a producing party to reject the "quick peek"

defendant would have the opportunity to review for privilege documents
identified by plaintiff as responsive. Id.
173. See Withers, supra note 35, at 37 (noting that the "quick peek"

approach "can result in tremendous cost savings for both parties").
174. See Rowe Entm't, Inc., 205 F.R.D. at 432-33. In response to
defendant's argument that the costs of reviewing requested e-mail messages
for privilege review constituted an undue burden, the court suggested that
"[t]he sanctity of the defendants' documents [could] be adequately preserved at
little cost by enforcement of the confidentiality order and by the... ["quick
peek"] protocol." Id. at 432.
175. See id. at 433 (providing "the fact that... a document has been

reviewed by counsel or by the expert shall not constitute a waiver of any claim

of privilege or confidentiality"); Withers, supra note 35, at 37 (suggesting that
the "quick peek" agreement requires a "strong safety net" that may be provided
by a case management order).
176. See In re Down Coming Corp., 261 F.3d 280, 284 (2d Cir. 2001). The
court conceded that "compelled disclosure of privileged attorney-client

communications, absent waiver or an applicable exception, is contrary to well

established precedent." Id. "[W]e have found no authority ...that holds that
imposition of a protective order like the one issued by the district court permits
a court to order disclosure of privileged attorney-client communications...
.[A] protective order is an inadequate surrogate for the privilege." Id.; see also
Rowe Entr 't, Inc., 205 F.R.D. at 432 (observing that "even with [the provision
of protective orders], however, the disclosure of privileged documents cannot
be compelled"); PROPOSED AMENDMENTS AND COMM. NOTES, supra note 38,
at 21 (emphasizing the voluntary nature of the "claw back" and "quick peek"
agreements).
177. See Rowe Entr't,Inc., 205 F.R.D. at 432.
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proposal and choose to perform
their own privilege review according
78
to more traditional methods.'
c. Dual option: "claw back" or "quickpeek"

Courts may also propose a "claw back" arrangement as one of
two alternatives, the other being a "quick peek" arrangement. 179 A
court's willingness to enter a protective order preventing against
waiver in the event privileged documents are disclosed may depend
upon the option the producing party chooses.' 80 For example, the
court may decline to enter a protective order if the party chooses the
"claw back" rather than the "quick peek" alternative.181 This reflects
the notion that if a party insists on performing a privilege review
before producing documents, that party should bear the risk that
inadvertent disclosure may constitute a waiver.182 On the other hand,
if the party is willing to place its trust in the hands of the court and
the opposing party, in the interest of the increased efficiency
afforded by the "quick peek" arrangement, the party may receive the
178. See id. at 433. Defendants could elect to review their own electronic
data, producing to plaintiff a privilege log along with hard drives and backup
tapes from which irrelevant and privilege materials have been erased. Id. On
the other hand, defendants could turn over the electronic documents before
conducting a privilege review. See also Gambale v. Deutsche Bank Ag, No.
02 Civ. 4791 HB DFE, 2002 WL 31655326 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2002)
(providing the producing party with a choice between following a "claw back"
discovery plan, similar to the one adopted in Rowe, and submitting a different
discovery protocol agreed to by both parties).
179. See Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 52 Fed. R. Serv. 3d
(West) 168, 179-81 (E.D. La. 2002) (providing that Defendant could produce
documents pursuant to a "quick peek" agreement (option one) or to a "claw
back" agreement (option two)); Rowe Entm't., Inc., 205 F.R.D. at 432;
Gambale, 2002 WL 31655326, at *1.
180. See Murphy Oil, 52 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) at 179-81 (providing more
protection against waiver under the "quick peek" option than under the "claw
back" option).
181. See id. at 179 n.3. In contrast to the court in Medtronic Sofamor Danek,
Inc. v. Michelson, 56 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 1159 (W.D. Tenn. 2003), the
court in Murphy Oil expressly denied to grant an attorney's-eyes-only
provision in the event Defendant chose the "claw back" option. Murphy Oil,
52 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) at 179 n.3. Furthermore, unlike the court order for
the "quick peek" arrangement, the court order for the "claw back" arrangement
did not include a provision protecting against waiver of privilege in the event
the defendant inadvertently produced a privileged document. Id. at 180-91.
182. See id.
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waiver. 183
court's assurance that production will not constitute a
Some courts, however, will not expressly condition a protective
184
Nonetheless, a
order on selection of the "quick peek" option.
producing party should urge the court to use language that clearly
provides for a non-waiver provision in either case. Lack of clarity in
this respect creates uncertainty as to whether the producing party will
be entitled to the same protective provisions in the event a privilege
document is inadvertently produced 85pursuant to the "claw back" as
opposed to the "quick peek" option.'
d. Special masters and neutral computer experts

In cases involving complex electronic discovery issues, parties
may agree to the appointment of a neutral computer expert or special
master1 86 under a duty to facilitate protocols such as those endorsing
1 87
For example, courts
the "claw back" and "quick peek" methods.
183. See id.
184. See Rowe Entm't, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421,

at 432-33 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). The "quick peek" option included an attorney's-

eyes-only provision and an order ensuring production of privileged documents
would not constitute a waiver or privilege. Id. In the event Defendants chose
to review the electronic data for privilege before turning it over to Plaintiff, the
court indicated that the "process would then continue as described above,"
under the "quick peek" option. Id.
This language seems to indicate any privileged documents produced
under the "claw back" approach would be treated in the same manner as
documents produced under the "quick peek" arrangement. Thus, in either
case, produced documents would be subject to the attorney's-eyes-only
provision and any production of any privileged documents would not

constitute a waiver.

185. See id. at 432-33. The court's use of vague language ("process would
then continue as described above") created uncertainty as to whether the
Defendants would be entitled to the same protective provisions as were
provided under the "quick peek" option. Id.; see also, Murphy Oil, 52 Fed. R.
Serv. 3d (West) at 179 n.3. At the least, litigants in Murphy Oil enjoyed the
certainty provided by the court's statement that the attorney's-eyes-only
provision intended to protect against dissemination of defendants' privileged
documents by plaintiff would only be in place if defendants chose the "quick
peek" rather than the "claw back" arrangement. Id.
186. "The court in which any action is pending may appoint a special master

therein. As used in these rules the word 'master' includes a referee, an auditor,
an examiner, and an assessor." FED. R. Civ. P. 53(a). "A reference to a master

shall be the exception and not the rule." Id. 53(b).
187. See Withers, supra note 161, at 6 ("When the parties cannot come to
agree on a privilege protection protocol, particularly when discovery involved
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and litigants have relied on computer experts to retrieve electronic
data from storage devices as well as to perform the technical
procedures necessary to search electronic data. 188 Courts generally
provide that the computer expert should be designated either by
mutual agreement of the parties or selected by the court from a list of
experts provided by the parties.189
Reliance on a neutral computer expert for the retrieval and
searching of data for privilege and relevance naturally requires a
litigant to permit the third party to access potentially privileged
documents. In order to protect litigants against claims that any
the production of a computer itself and review of all the files on the computer's
hard drive, many courts have resorted to the use of a neutral expert."). Where
parties can agree to on a neutral expert, a special master does not need to be
appointed by the court. See Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 56
Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 1159, 1171 (W.D. Tenn. 2003) (appointing a special
master to oversee the "claw back" discovery protocol); Rowe Entm 't, Inc., 205
F.R.D. at 433 (deciding to appoint a computer expert to oversee production
pursuant to a "quick peek" agreement); Murphy Oil, 52 Fed. R. Serv. 3d
(West) at 179 (appointing computer expert to oversee either the "quick peek"
or "claw back" discovery process.); see also Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles,
60 F. Supp. 1050, 1054-55 (S.D.N.Y 1999). The court in Playboy Enterprises
took it upon itself to develop an electronic discovery protocol overseen by a
computer expert either designated by the court or appointed by the parties. See
id.
188. See Medtronic, 56 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) at 1171 ("Given the amount
of electronic data at issue, the court finds that the appointment of a special
master to oversee discovery is warranted and that the special master should be
a technology or computer expert."); see also Rowe Entre 't, Inc., 205 F.R.D. at
433 (ordering plaintiffs expert to obtain a mirror image of hard drives and
back-up tapes); Murphy Oil, 52 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) at 179 (ordering that
an expert retrieve selected data from backup tape); Playboy Enters., Inc., 60 F.
Supp 2d at 1055 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (ordering the expert to determine whether
deleted e-mail messages could be resurrected and to create a mirror image of
defendant's hard drive).
189. See Medtronic, 56 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) at 1171 (instructing the
parties to reach an agreement on the designation of a special master and
providing in the alternative that the court would appoint a special master from
lists provided by both parties); Rowe Entm't, Inc., 205 F.R.D. at 433
(instructing the plaintiff to designate a computer expert and giving defendant
an opportunity to object to the designation); Murphy Oil, 52 Fed. R. Serv. 3d
(West) at 179 (instructing the plaintiff to designate a computer expert and
giving defendant an opportunity to object to the designation); Playboy Enters.,

Inc., 60 F. Supp. 2d at 1055 (requesting the parties meet and confer to agree on
the designation of a computer expert and providing if the parties failed to agree
that the court would select one from candidates chosen by the parties).
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privilege was waived by disclosure to a third party, courts have
issued protective orders complementing any appointment of a
computer expert to assist in electronic discovery.' 19 Courts may rely
on special masters and neutral computer experts particularly where
parties have engaged in spoliation of electronic data to evade
producing documents responsive to opposing counsel's discovery
requests. ' 91

4. Protective Orders
Protective orders are essential to the cooperation of the parties 1in
plans. 92
creating innovative and effective electronic discovery
Pursuant to FRCP 26(c), a party may solicit the court to "make any
order which justice requires to protect a party or person from
annoyance,93 embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or
expense."'
190. See Medtronic, 56 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) at 1177 ("[Tlhe neutral

computer expert[] shall be bound by the terms of any and all confidentiality

agreements and protective orders now in place, or to be put in place in the

future ... ."); Rowe Entm 't., Inc., 205 F.R.D. at 433 (indicating that privilege
claims would not be waived as to documents reviewed by the expert); Murphy
Oil, 52 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) at 180; Playboy Enters., Inc. 60 F. Supp. 2d at
1055 ("To the extent the computer specialist has direct or indirect access to
information protected by the attorney-client privilege, such 'disclosure' will
not result in a waiver of the attorney-client privilege.").
191. See Playboy Enters., Inc., 60 F. Supp. at 1051 (determining it would
appoint a neutral computer expert after defendant had pursued a practice of

deleting in and out-going e-mail messages despite the fact that the "e-mails

[were] responsive to Plaintiff s request for production of documents").
192. See Withers, supra note 35, at 37 ("A case management order may be
useful in shielding the parties from the worst consequences of well-intentioned
efforts to reduce the potential cost and delay of privilege screening. .. ").
193. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). Among the types of orders that the Federal Rules
has anticipated the court may issue are:
(1) that the disclosure or discovery not be had; (2) that the disclosure
or discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions,
including a designation of the time or place; (3) that the discovery may
be had only by a method of discovery other than that selected by the
party seeking discovery; (4) that certain matters not be inquired into,
or that the scope of the disclosure or discovery be limited to certain
matters; (5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except
persons designated by the court; (6) that a deposition, after being
sealed, be opened only by order of the court; (7) that a trade secret or
other confidential research, development, or commercial information
not be revealed or be revealed only in a designated way; and (8) that
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While courts have readily adopted protective orders where
parties have worked together and with the court to reach a feasible
electronic discovery protocol, courts will endorse a blanket
protection against waiver of privilege through inadvertent disclosure
showing that efforts will be made to protect the
without some
94
1
privilege.
All three of the scenarios discussed above-the "claw back" and
"quick peek" arrangement, as well as the use of a neutral expert or
special master to conduct electronic discovery-raise one question
on which courts have largely remained silent. Even subject to a
protective order, does the disclosure of privileged information by a
litigant to opposing counsel, a neutral computer expert or a special
master, waive the claim of privilege as to a third party not bound by
the protective order in a parallel or subsequent litigation? 195 Perhaps

the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information
enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court.
Id.; see also PlayboyEnters. Inc., 60 F. Supp. 2d at 1053 ("The only restriction
in [electronic discovery] is that the producing party be protected against undue
burden and expense and/or invasion of privileged matter.").
194. See Holland v. GMAC Mortgage Corp., No. 03-2666-CM, 2004 WL
1534179 (D. Kan. June 30, 2004). The parties sought a protective order
allowing them to designate as confidential all computer records or other
confidential electronic information. Id. at *1. Noting that "the decision to
enter a protective order lies within the sound discretion of the court," the court
declined to adopt such protective order. Id.; see also Rowe Entm 't., Inc., 205
F.R.D. at 428 (finding a blanket protective order against discovery of
defendant's e-mail messages was unwarranted considering the confidentiality
order was adequate to protect defendant's privilege interests); Ciba-Geigy v.
Sandoz Ltd., 916 F. Supp. 404, 406 (D.N.J. 1995). Before issuing a protective
order effectuating a "claw back" arrangement, the court noted that it had
rejected the "'blanket' inadvertent disclosure clause advocated by plaintiff's
counsel, and insisted that any such provision would not excuse the parties from
conducting a privilege review prior to the production of documents, in
accordance with controlling case law." Id. Subsequently, when defendants
inadvertently produced privileged information from a litigation database, the
court rejected the contention that that "the Protective Order immunize[d] all
[unintentional] disclosures against any waiver argument." Id. at 408.
195. See Eric Van Buskirk, Practical Strategies for Digital Discovery:
Preliminary Considerations, 52 THE DIGITAL DISCOVERER, Feb. 2003, at 4
("Prior to seeking the order of protocol, counsel should investigate the degree
to which non-parties will be bound by it. Even if parties stipulate that waiver is
restricted to a particular suit, courts in subsequent or parallel litigations are not
bound by and might not respect the stipulation."). In his article, Ken Withers
stated:

Summer 2005]

PRIVILEGE & THE ECPA

1729

this is one of the uncertainties influencing the courts to conclude that
"quick peek" arrangements cannot be forced upon unwilling
196
litigants.
Although case law on this topic is scarce, particularly in the
electronic context, recent case law in the context of paper discovery
suggests no waiver occurs where "documents [are] produced...
under a protective order, stipulation or other express reservation of
the producing party's claim of privilege as to the material
disclosed."' 197 Production of privileged documents under such
circumstances has been likened to the court compelled disclosure of
privileged documents for in camera review which cannot possibly
effect a waiver. 198 It is argued this approach promotes the letter and
the spirit of the FRCP as provided by Rule 37(a)(2), requiring parties
to confer before bringing a motion to compel, and by Rule 1,
requiring that the Federal Rules be construed to secure the "just,
199
speedy, and inexpensive determination" of controversies.
Although it is unclear what the consequences that the innovative
approaches to electronic discovery will have on privilege claims,
perhaps this reasoning will provide some guidance to courts
confronting the issue.
D. Waiver of Privilegeby InadvertentDisclosure: The Three
Different Tests and the Significance of the ElectronicMedium
If the "specter" of inadvertent disclosure has always plagued
attorneys involved in discovery, 20 it becomes even more harrowing

[N]o matter what the parties may agree to and the court may bless, a

third party or a litigant in a parallel action can easily make the case

that the agreement does not bind them, and the parties have
consciously waived any claim to privilege with respect to the entire

information collection.

Withers, supra note 35, at 37.

196. See Rowe Entm't, Inc., 205 F.R.D. at 432; Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v.

Fluor Daniel, Inc., 52 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 168, 177 (E.D. La. 2002).

197. Collaboration Props., Inc. v. Polycom, Inc., 224 F.R.D. 473, 479
(quoting Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n v. Shamrock Broad. Co., 521 F. Supp.
638, 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Sandoz Ltd., 916 F.Supp. 404, 410 (D.N.J.
1995).
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20 1
in the context of electronic discovery.
The problem of privilege review centers on its corollary in
many jurisdictions: the consequences of inadvertent
production of privileged information that have been
overlooked in the mass of otherwise relevant and producible
data. This problem predates the advent of electronic
discovery, of course but it has been brought into sharp focus
in recent years. The volume of electronically stored
information has increased exponentially, resulting in
productions of e-mail messages, word processing files, and
other data equivalent to tens of millions of pages of
conventional paper documents. Depending on the
jurisdiction and the facts of each case, the consequences of
inadvertently producing privileged information can mean
that the privilege is deemed waived as to that document, to
that category of privileged documents, to all privileged
or perhaps to all privileged
documents related to that issue,
20 2
documents related to the case.
Courts are split among three different theories of the effect that
the inadvertent production of a document has on a litigant's claim to
privilege. 20 3 The most unforgiving approach provides that any
disclosure of a privileged document, whether intentional or
inadvertent, constitutes a waiver of the privilege. 204 The most lenient

201. David Shub, The e-discovery edge: Expertise and Preparation Can
Save Millions, at 6 (2003), ("Any document production carries the risk of

inadvertent waiver of the attorney-client privilege, but electronic document
productions heighten that risk. When producing a mountain of e-mail messages
with myriad attachments, the danger that an otherwise protected attorney-client
communication may be missed and mistakenly produced rises dramatically."),
at http://www.dtiglobal.com/pdf articlesiThe%20E-Discovery%20Edge%20
Expertise%20and%2OPreparation%2OCan%20Save%2OMillions.pdf.
202. See Withers, supra note 35, at 35-36.

203. See United States v. Rigas, 281 F. Supp. 2d 733, 737 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
204. The D.C. Circuit and the Federal District Court for the state of Maine

have endorsed this approach. See Bowles v. Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders,

224 F.R.D. 246, 253 (D.D.C. 2004). Defendant sought to recover several email communications from the Plaintiff. Id. The court observed that "[t]he
D.C. Circuit follows a 'strict rule on waiver of privileges."' Id. (quoting SEC
v. Lavin, 111 F.3d 921, 929 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). "A client wishing to preserve
the privilege 'must treat the confidentiality of attorney-client communications
like jewels-if not crown jewels."') Id. (quoting In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d
976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989)); FDIC v. Singh, 140 F.R.D. 252, 253 (D. Me. 1992)
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approach defines waiver as an intentional and knowing
relinquishment, and thus, holds that the attorney-client privilege can
The possibility that an
be waived through inadvertence. 20 5
inadvertent disclosure could take place in the context of electronic
discovery would probably have little bearing on the result produced
by either of these absolute approaches.
The third and more moderate approach permits the court to
balance five factors in order to determine whether inadvertent
disclosure of privileged documents results in a waiver. 20 6 The
factors are: (1) the reasonableness of the precautions taken to prevent
the inadvertent disclosure; (2) the time taken to rectify the error; (3)
the volume of discovery versus the extent of the specific disclosure
at issue; (4) the extent of disclosure; and (5) whether the overriding
interests of justice would be served by relieving a party of its
Because electronic discovery poses unique risks of
error.20 7
inadvertent disclosure, perhaps the outcome of this test would be
affected by its application in the electronic context. The factors on
which, as a practical matter, electronic discovery probably has the
most influence are the adequacy of the precautions, the scope of the
disclosure relative to the volume produced, and the extent of the
disclosure.
1. Reasonable Precautions
In the context of electronic discovery, litigants can take various
technical measures to prevent inadvertent disclosures that go beyond
manual review and segregation of privileged documents from
responsive documents. Keyword searches discussed above in Part C
represent one such measure.2 0 8 Another way to prevent against
("[W]hen a document is disclosed, even inadvertently, it is no longer held in
confidence despite the intentions of the party... . One cannot 'unring' a
bell.").
205. This is a decidedly minority approach. See Helman v. Murry's Steaks,
Inc., 728 F. Supp. 1099, 1104 (D. Del. 1990).
206. See United States v. Keystone Sanitation Co., Inc., 885 F. Supp. 672,
676 (M.D. Pa. 1994); Rigas, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 738.
207. For cases applying the five factor test, see Keystone Sanitation, 885 F.
Supp. at 676; Rigas, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 738.
208. For a discussion on the use of keyword searches to perform initial
screening of documents for privilege, see supra Part V.C.2.b.
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inadvertent disclosure is isolating responsive files on hard drives
immunized from deletion or addition. 209 This prevents inadvertent
disclosures by making it impossible to create new possibly privileged
documents on hard drives containing documents designated for
A court may also consider whether a party has
production.
arranged for the production process to be handled by information
technology specialists and has obtained assurances of their security
measures. 2 11 In some instances, prudence may call for supervision of
the information technology (IT) specialists to ensure that they don't
access non-responsive data. 2 12 Accounts containing sensitive data
213
known to be privileged should be password protected.
Finally,
although protective orders providing that inadvertent disclosure do
not constitute waivers may not be binding on third parties, they
reasonable precautions had been
would probably favor a finding that
214
privilege.
of
waiver
taken to avoid
If despite such precautionary steps a party inadvertently
discloses electronic documents, the producing party will probably be
found to have adopted reasonable precautions to prevent the
disclosure.2 1 5 In fact, courts may use this factor to take into
209.
210.
211.
212.

See Rigas, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 739.
See id.
See id. at 738.
See id.; see also Entry Regarding Inadvertently Disclosed Document at

3, In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prod. Liab. Litig., Master File No. IP

No. 00-9373-C-B/S (S.D. Ind., entered Oct. 10, 2001) (MDL No. 1373), at
http://www.insd.uscourts.gov/Firestone/bfdocs/93731739.pdf ("[O]ne might
certainly question whether Ford sufficiently supervised its outside vendors and
had adequate procedures in place... to prevent.., inadvertent productions

from occurring.").
213. See Rigas, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 738.
214. See PROPOSED AMENDMENTS AND COMM. NOTES, supra note 38, at 15
("Orders entered [pursuant to the Rule 26(f) conference] may bear on whether

a waiver has occurred.").
215. See Rigas, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 738-39.

The government obtained

defendant's hard drives and was reviewing them prior to defendant's demand
that the government produce a copy of the hard drives to defendant. Id. at 735.
The government took adequate precautions to ensure that its own files would
not be intermingled with the electronic data on defendant's hard drives. Id. at

740. For example, the government directed its IT staff to install the
defendant's material on computer terminals designated to screening
defendant's files. Id. at 738. The hard drives of these terminals were to be
partitioned in such a manner as to prevent the people screening the material

from writing government files on to the hard drives. Id. at 739. Government
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consideration the technical difficulties that might impair a producing
216
party's ability to foresee and guard against inadvertent disclosures.
2. The Scope of the Discovery
Because electronic discovery often entails the production of
immense amounts of electronically stored data, this factor will
2 17 In order to tip
frequently weigh in favor of a finding of no wavier.
the balance in one's favor on this factor, a party should bring the
scope of discovery to the court's attention before production and
should avoid rushing production where there is no immediate
deadline for completion. 2 18 Additionally, because keyword searches
often produce an inexact forecast of responsive documents, parties
of
disputing the issue of waiver may be able to characterize the scope
2
1?
positions.
particular
their
production in a manner that supports

user accounts were password protected and maintained on a secure network.
Id. at 738. The computer vendor hired by defendant to copy the government
hard drives containing the seized material performed this task under
government supervision. Id. Nonetheless, due to the inadequate partitioning
of the hard drives by the government IT staff, the copy obtained by defendant
contained an entire government user account. Id. at 739.
216. Id. (considering that although in hindsight the government could have
prevented the disclosure, it occurred as a result of a rare technical occurrence
which could not have been foreseen at the time of production).
217. See id. at 741. The court reached this conclusion where the government
produced a "tremendous" volume of discovery documents, including
"hundreds of CD ROMs" and numerous hard drives. Id. at 740-41. The court
considered the 130 replicated files produced by the government were
insignificant in comparison to the overall volume of production. Id. at 741.
218. See United States v. Keystone Sanitation Co., Inc., 885 F. Supp. 672,
676 (M.D. Pa. 1994). The court noted "[a]lthough they now complain that it
was... a massive production, the court set no immediate deadline for
completion of that particular production and the Keystone Defendants did not
request additional time to review the documents before they began production
so that they could devise a statement of privilege." Id. The court concluded
that defendant had waived its claim of privilege as to e-mail messages advising
the extraction of as many resources out of the defendant corporation as
possible. Id. at 675-76.
219. See Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., No. 02 C 6832, 2004 WL
1895122, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 2004) ("The parties have manipulated the
numbers and categorized the 8,660 documents in various ways that supports
their respective positions."); Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 56
Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 1159, 1161 (W.D. Tenn. 2003) (indicating that the
requesting party estimated that the information sought contained about 20,000
gigabytes, while the producing party claimed that the production would
approximate 61 terabytes).
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For example, a keyword search may count as hits all of the
documents attached to an e-mail message, even if the message alone
contains the targeted term. 22 A party arguing that a waiver had
taken place should seek to account for these false hits and argue that
the scope was smaller than the keyword search would indicate. On
the other hand, a party arguing that a disclosure did not effect a
waiver should include all hits in its assessment of the scope of
discovery considering that all such hits probably have to be verified
anyway.
Even where discovery is vast, courts have shown intolerance
toward arguments that no waiver has occurred where the same
document has been disclosed inadvertently on more than one
occasion. 22 1 Furthermore, even in the presence of a court sanctioned
"claw back" agreement, a court may find that a litigant has waived
any privilege by inadvertently producing a document more than
once.

2 22

220. See Wiginton, 2004 WL 1895122, at *1 (describing the phenomenon
known as family cascading).
221. See, e.g., Entry Regarding Inadvertently Disclosed Document, In re
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prod. Liab. Litig., Master File No. IP No.
00-9373-C-B/S (S.D. Ind., entered Oct. 10, 2001) (MDL No. 1373), at
In a multihttp://www.insd.uscourts.gov/Firestonelbfdocs/93731739.pdf.
district products liability case, defendants produced an immense amount of
data from electronic databases. Id. at *2. The court was willing to agree
defendant had not waived any privilege by inadvertently posting a document
on a Web site established specifically for discovery purposes. Id. at *3.
However, the court held that the privilege had been waived when the
privileged document was produced a second time in a hard copy version. Id. at

*4. "To produce the document once was inadvertence; to produce it again
while at the same time vigorously asserting in court the importance of keeping
it confidential, was something else entirely." Id.; Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Sandoz
Ltd., 916 F. Supp. 404, 414 (D.N.J. 1996) (finding clear waiver where
defendant produced 681 documents from its litigation database including six
copies of a privileged document).

222. See Entry Regarding Inadvertently Disclosed Document at 3-4, In re
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prod. Liab. Litig., Master File No. IP No.
00-9373-C-B/S (S.D. Ind., entered Oct. 10, 2001) (MDL No. 1373), at http://
www.insd.uscourts.gov/Firestone/bfdocs/93731739.pdf. Defendant's argued
that the "claw back" provision in the case management order protected against
waiver even in the event of a second inadvertent production. Id. The court
rejected this contention stating that these "unusual circumstances-which
certainly were not contemplated by the court when it approved the" case
management order-warranted the determination that Ford's second disclosure
"was inexcusable and constituted a waiver of any privilege that may have
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3. The Extent of Disclosure
The extent of disclosure is a factor that could arguably be
impacted in the context of electronic discovery. For example,
considering that e-mail allows for quick and broad dissemination of
information through its copy and forwarding functions, the extent of
disclosure of an e-mail message could be significant. 223 In this
sense, extent of disclosure may weigh in favor of a finding of waiver
more often in the context of electronic discovery than in that of paper
discovery.
A court would probably find, however, that if a privileged email message were copied to anyone other than a client's attorney,
the communication was not privileged in the first place because it
would "lack[] the required attribute of a confidential communication
to the corporate attorney." 224 Furthermore, if a client sends a
privileged e-mail message to his attorney and later forwards it to a
non-privileged person, the disclosure would represent an225intentional
waiver of privilege rather than an inadvertent disclosure.
E. ElectronicDiscovery and the
Electronic CommunicationsPrivacy Act
1. Title I of the ECPA: The Wire Tap Act
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) is aimed
at increasing the expectation of privacy in electronic
communications. 226 Title I of the ECPA (Wire Tap Act)227 prohibits
originally attached to the document." Id. at *4.
223. See United States v. Segal, No. 02-CR-1 12, 2004 WL 830428, at *3
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 2004) ("[E]-mail... permits the broad dissemination...
[of] communications.").
224. Mac-Ray Corp. v. Ricotta, No. 03-CV-524S(F), 2004 WL 1368857, at
*2 (W.D.N.Y. June 16, 2004). Communications which merely limit
distribution does not evidence an intention to create and guard a confidential
and privileged communication. See B.F.G. of Ill. v. Ameritech Corp., No. 99
C 4604, 2001 WL 1414468, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 2001).
225. See Women's InterArt Ctr., Inc. v. N.Y.C. Econ. Dev., 223 F.R.D. 156,
161 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("Generally, [an e-mail attachment] to be sent to a third
party 'removes the cloak of confidentiality necessary for protection under the
attorney-client privilege."').

226. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2712
(2000 & Supp. II 2002).
227. See id. §§ 2510-2522.
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any person 228 from intercepting 229 or attempting to intercept any

electronic communication. 230
In addition to criminalizing
interception of electronic communications, the Wire Tap Act also
creates a civil cause of action which permits persons to sue 23for
1
damages anyone who intercepts their electronic communications.
Because all circuits applying the statute have construed the term
"intercept" narrowly, 232 the Wire Tap Act has limited applicability to
electronic discovery in the civil context. "Interception" of an
electronic communication within the meaning of the Wire Tap Act
can only occur contemporaneously with the transmission of
electronic data. 233 Thus, in order to "intercept" an e-mail message, a
228. Title 18 U.S.C. § 2510(6) defines "person" as "any employee, or agent
of the United States or any State or political subdivision thereof, and any
individual, partnership, association, joint stock company, trust, or corporation."
Id. § 2510(6) (2000).
229. Title 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) defines "intercept" as "the aural or other
acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication
through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device." Id. § 2510(4)
(2000).
230. Title 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) defines "electronic communication" as:
any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or
intelligence of any nature transmitted ... by a wire, radio,
electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system ... ,but does
not include-(A) any wire or oral communication; (B) any
communication made through a tone-only paging device; (C) any
communication from a tracking device.., or (D) electronic funds
transfer information stored by a financial institution in a
communications system used for the electronic storage and transfer of
funds.
Id. § 2510(12) (2000).
231. See id. § 2520 (2000 & Supp. 112002).
232. See Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 113-14 (3d Cir.
2003); United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1046-49 (11th Cir. 2003);
Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 876 (9th Cir. 2002); Steve
Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 460-63 (5th Cir. 1994);
Wesley Coll. v. Pitts, 974 F. Supp. 375, 381-89 (D. Del. 1997).
233. See Fraser,352 F.3d at 113 ("Congress amended the Wiretap Act in
1986... to extend protection to electronic communications, [however] it 'did
not intend to change the definition of 'intercept."") (quoting Steve Jackson
Games, Inc., 36 F.3d at 462). Under the old Wire Tap Act, "intercept" had
been judicially defined as "contemporaneous in the context of an aural
communication." See id.; see also Steiger, 318 F.3d at 1048-49 (endorsing the
Fifth and Ninth Circuit view that "contemporaneous interception-i.e., an
acquisition during 'flight'-is required to implicate the Wiretap Act with
respect to electronic communications"); Konop, 302 F.3d at 878 (holding that
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person would have to access the electronic communication while in
transit through the Internet during the instant between the moment of
transmission and that of receipt for storage. 234 For technical reasons,
it would be virtually impossible for any civil litigant to seek
electronic discovery in this manner. 235 Furthermore, resort to such
tactics would trigger criminal as well as civil liability.2 36 At the very
least, however, a civil litigant engaged in production of electronic
data via the Internet can be reassured that no third party could
intercept the data without violating the Wire Tap Act.
2. Title II of the ECPA: The Stored Communications Act
Title II of the ECPA (Stored Communications Act) 23 7 imposes
criminal and civil 2 38 liability on any person who "(1) intentionally

accesses without authorization a facility through which an electronic
communication service is provided; or (2) intentionally exceeds an
authorization to access that facility; [and obtains access to an]
electronic communication while it is in electronic storage in such
system." 239 Title 18 U.S.C. Section 2510(17) defines electronic
"for a website ... to be 'intercepted' in violation of the Wiretap Act, it must be
acquired during transmission, not while it is in electronic storage"); Wesley
Coll., 974 F. Supp. at 385-86 ("[E]ach court... has concluded that there can
be no interception under Title I if the acquisition of the contents of electronic
communications is not contemporaneous with their transmissions.").
234. See Fraser,352 F.3d at 114. The term electronic communication does
not include electronic storage. Id. Therefore, "there can be no 'intercept' of an
e-mail in storage, as an e-mail in storage is by definition not an 'electronic
communication."' Id.; see also Konop, 302 F.3d at 878 (indicating that an
electronic communication cannot be intercepted if it is in storage).
235. See Ian C. Ballon, IP and Internet Litigation: Law and Developing
Trends, in EIGHTH ANNUAL INTERNET LAW INSTITUTE: How CORPORATE
AMERICA IS HARNESSING THE INTERNET, 475-76 (2004) ("It is virtually
impossible to intercept an email while in transit over the Internet...
.[I]nformation is transmitted over the Internet in packets. A single message
may be broken into several different packets, which may be sent over different
routes before being reassembled at their destination point. A single packet
would be almost impossible to target and virtually unintelligible.").
236. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
237. See id. §§ 2701-2712.
238. See id. § 2701 (providing for criminal liability); id. § 2707 (providing
for injunctive relief, damages and punitive damages).
239. Id. § 2701(a)(1)-(2) (2000). 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(l)-(2) exempts from
liability under the Stored Communications Act people or entities "providing a
wire or electronic communications service" and "user[s] of [the] service with
respect to a communication of or intended for that user." Id. § 2701 (c)(1)-(2).
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storage as "(A) any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or
electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission
thereof; and (B) any... storage by an electronic communication
of such
for purposes of backup protection
service
24
Although the statute defines "electronic
communication. , 0
storage" to some extent, there is a split in authority on the precise
meaning of this term.241 The degree to which the Stored
Communications Act is implicated by electronic discovery in the
civil context may depend on the interpretation of "electronic
storage."
a. Interpretationsof "electronic storage"
Several courts have concluded that the term "electronic storage"
refers only to those electronic communications that are held on the
Internet Service Provider's (ISP) server that have not been accessed
or opened by the intended recipient. 242 This narrow definition of
240. Id. § 2510(17).
241. See Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir.
2002) (noting that any disagreements over the construction of the Stored
Communications Act may be attributable to the fact that the "intersection of
[Title I and Title II] is a complex, and often convoluted, area of the law....
[U]ntil Congress brings the laws in line with modem technology, protection of
the Internet and websites ... will remain a confusing and uncertain area of the
law."); Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co, 135 F. Supp. 2d 623, 633 (E.D. Pa.
2001), rev'd in part on other grounds, 352 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 2003) ("The
ECPA has been noted for its lack of clarity."); Doe v. Aschroft, 334 F. Supp.
2d 471, 488 n.72 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("Courts are not uniform in interpreting the
statute's confusing and overlapping definitions.").
242. See In re DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 512
(S.D.N.Y. 2001).
It appears that the section is specifically targeted at communications
temporarily stored by electronic communications services incident to
their transmission-for example, when an email service stores a
message until the addressee downloads it... . Title II only protects
electronic communications stored "for a limited time" in the "middle"
of a transmission, i.e. when an electronic communication service
temporarily stores a communication while waiting to deliver it.
Id.; see also Fraser, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 633-34, 636 (interpreting electronic
storage to mean the period of intermediate storage prior to recipients access to
the communication whereupon transmission is complete); In re CI Host, Inc.,
92 S.W.3d 514, 515 (Tex. 2002) (applying federal law and declining to address
plaintiffs claim that e-mail messages are only in electronic storage when they
are in "temporary, intermediate storage, before they are received [or opened]
by the intended recipient").
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electronic storage limits the applicability of the Stored
Communications Act in the context of electronic discovery. For
example, a discovery request which seeks production of e-mail
it
messages could only plausibly trigger the ECPA if the messages 243
recipient.
intended
the
by
seeks have not been opened
Furthermore, a litigant that accesses electronic communications in
storage pursuant to the authorization of the opposing party as part of
plan would be exempted from liability under the
the discovery
244
ECPA.
The Ninth Circuit envisions a broader application of the Stored
Communications Act by relying on subsection (B) of the statutory
definition of electronic storage, which includes e-mail messages
stored for the purpose of backup protection. 245 In Theofel, plaintiffs
sued defendants for violation of their privacy rights under the
ECPA. 246 Pursuant to a subpoena issued for purposes of discovery in
a different civil case against the defendants, corporate officers of
Integrated Capital Associates, Inc. (ICA), obtained e-mail messages
from ICA's ISP, NetGate. 247 A number of the messages obtained by
the defendant were taken from the plaintiff's e-mail accounts and
were not related to the subject matter of the litigation. 24 8 The Ninth
Circuit adopted the magistrate judge's finding that the "subpoena
was 'transparently and egregiously' overbroad and that defendants

243. Even un-opened e-mail which remains on an Internet service provider's
server is only in "electronic storage" within the meaning of the Stored
Communications Act for 180 days, beyond which point in time, electronic
storage of such communication ceases to be temporary or intermediate. Doe v.
Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 487-88 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
244. See 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(2) (2000) (expressly exempting conduct
authorized by a user of an Internet service "with respect to a communication of
or intended for that user").
245. See Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1072-73 (9th Cir. 2004).
246. Id. at 1072.
247. Id. at 1071.
248. Id.
One might have thought.., that the subpoena would request only email related to the subject matter of the litigation, or maybe messages
sent during some relevant time period... [b]ut [the subpoena] ordered
"production of all copies of e-mails sent or received by anyone at ICA,
with no limitation as to time or scope .... Most [of the e-mail
messages] ... were privileged or personal."

1740

LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 38:1683

249
acted with gross negligence and in bad faith.
The Ninth Circuit rejected the defendants' contention that the
opened or "delivered" e-mail messages did not fall within the
purview of the Stored Communications Act. 250 The court held that
even if the messages were not in temporary or intermediate storage
for the purpose of subsection (A), they were still protected under
subsection (B) of the Stored Communications Act as
communications being stored for backup purposes. 25 1 The court
explained:
An obvious purpose for storing a message on an ISP's
server after delivery is to provide a second copy of the
message in the event that the user needs to download it
again-if, for example, the message is accidentally erased
from the user's own computer. The ISP copy of the
message functions as a "backup" for the user. Notably,
nothing in the Act requires that the backup protection be for
the benefit of the ISP rather than the user. Storage under
these circumstances
thus literally falls within the statutory
2 52
definition.
The court criticized interpretations of the Stored Communications
Act that interpreted "backup protection" to include "only temporary
backup storage pending delivery. '253 According to the Ninth Circuit
this construction of the Act was contrary to the plain language of the
act because subsection (B), in contrast to subsection (A), does not
254
distinguish between intermediate and post-transmission storage.
By drawing this distinction the court held that while subsection (A)
protects only unopened e-mail, subsection (B) protects opened e-mail

249. See id. at 1079.
250. See id. at 1075 (declining to adhere to Fraser'sholding that "backup
protection" includes only temporary backup storage of transmitted messages
that have not been opened and not transmitted messages that have been opened
and remain in storage).
251. See id.
252. Id.
253. See id. at 1075. Both the court in Fraseras well as the United States, as
amicus curiae, adhered to this interpretation of the Stored Communication Act
on the basis that the language in subsection (B) ("any storage of [wire or
electronic] communications") applies only to backup copies of messages that
are themselves in temporary, intermediate storage under subsection (A). See
id. at 1075-76.
254. Id. at 1076.
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messages retained on the ISP's server as backup copies. 255 The court
noted that construing subsection (B) to include only those
communications that are protected by subsection (A) essentially
deprives subsection (B)256 of any independent significance, thus
rendering it superfluous.
Before applying its divergent interpretation of the Stored
Communications Act, the court resolved the question of whether
NetGate "authorized" the access to the e-mail messages such that the
25 7
defendants' conduct was immunized under Section 2701(c).
Considering that the subpoena was overbroad and, therefore, invalid,
NetGate's consensual provision of e-mail in compliance with the
subpoena was vitiated. 58 The court reversed the district court's
dismissal of the plaintiffs claim under
the Stored Communications
259
Act and remanded for final resolution.
b. Implicationsfor electronic discovery obtainedfrom ISPs
Theofel provides an example of an overzealous litigant who
abused an invalid subpoena to obtain discovery of electronic
communications unrelated to the subject matter of litigation. 260 At
least in the Ninth Circuit, such conduct constitutes grounds for both
261
criminal and civil liability under the Stored Communications Act.
Because the United States Supreme Court has not had occasion to
resolve the disagreement among the courts over the meaning of
"electronic storage," litigants retrieving e-mail messages from ISPs
as a part of electronic discovery should exercise extreme caution to
stay within the scope of relevancy regardless of any subpoena's
purported authorization of a broader discovery mandate.
c. Implicationsfor Web-based discovery
Another use of electronic technology that facilitates discovery
and that may increase the applicability of the Stored
Communications Act to electronic discovery is the creation and
255. See id. at 1075, 1077.
256. See id. at 1075-76.
257. See id. at 1073-75.
258. See id.

259. Id. at 1079.
260. See supra notes 245-59 and accompanying text.
261. See Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1079.
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maintenance of discovery Web sites in complex litigation. 262 At
least one court has held that Web sites are electronically stored
communications within the meaning of the Stored Communications
Act. 2663 The practical effect of this holding is that the Stored
Communications Act may impose criminal and civil liability on a
person4 who gains unauthorized access to a user-restricted Web
site.

26

The notion that Web sites are protected under the Stored
Communications Act may have implications for litigants engaged in
Web-based discovery for complex litigation cases. 265 Assuming
discovery Web sites are secure and accessible only by designated
users that are parties to the litigation, it is conceivable a designated
user could permit access to an unauthorized user. 266 Under such
circumstances, a litigant participating in Web based discovery may
state a claim against the person who accessed the stored electronic
communications posted on the Web site. 267 Thus, the Stored
Communications Act places on guard strangers to complex litigation
cases that may have an interest in accessing the information made
available on a discovery Web site. Certain forms of unauthorized
criminal and civil
access to a discovery Web site could trigger
268
act.
communications
stored
the
under
liability
262. See Entry Regarding Inadvertently Disclosed Document at 1, In re
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prod. Liab. Litig., Master File No. IP No.
00-9373-C-B/S (S.D. Ind., entered Oct. 10, 2001) (MDL No. 1373) (defendant
utilized an online electronic document depository that plaintiffs could access),
at http://www.insd.uscourts.gov/Firestone/bfdocs/93731739.pdf.
263. See Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002). In
Konop, plaintiff established a Web site where he posted information critical of
defendant employer, its officers and the union. Id. at 872. Plaintiff restricted
access by designating eligible users and requiring them to log on with a
username and password. Id. at 872-73. Vice President for defendant asked
permission from a designated user to use his name to create a password and
access the Web site. Id. at 873. By finding there was a triable issue of fact as

to whether defendant violated the Stored Communications Act, the court
essentially held that the Web site was a stored communication within the
meaning of the Stored Communications Act. Id. at 880.
264.
265.
266.
267.

See id.
See supra notes 262-64 and accompanying text.
See Konop, 302 F.3d at 873.
See id. at 880.

268. See Id. at 880. The Konop court refrained from labeling the employees
authorized to access the Web site as "users" as defined under the ECPA. Id.
Although the employee was eligible to view the Web site, there was no
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F. Conclusion
In responding to an electronic discovery request, litigants must
give careful thought to the issue of privilege. A proactive approach
to resolving technical difficulties involved in electronic discovery is
the most important step in protecting privilege claims. Cooperation
with opposing counsel and communication with the court will enable
litigants to develop discovery plans that minimize the threats that
electronic discovery poses to evidentiary privileges. Although the
electronic medium does not distract courts from evaluating the
substantial merit of a privilege claim, courts are generally
sympathetic to the unique burden that electronic discovery places on
litigants. Nonetheless, in the case of litigants and attorneys who
abuse the electronic discovery process, the courts may look to the
Stored Communications Act as a source of liability.

evidence that the employee ever used the site. Id. Thus, the court's analysis
seems to indicate that there may not be ECPA liability where an authorized
user accesses the Web site and then consents to a third party's use of the site,
absent other restrictions.
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